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I. Introduction 
Arbitration has its roots deep in antiquity1 and has long 
enjoyed widespread use in the United States and across the globe.2 
In essence, it is a contractual form of dispute resolution used 
primarily as an alternative to litigation.3 The parties to a dispute 
                                                                                                     
 1. See John T. Blackenship, Isomorphism of Construction Arbitration: The 
Key to Its Prevention and Reversal, 65-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 114, 116 (2010) 
(tracing the history of arbitration to Ancient Babylon and Greece). 
 2. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International 
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1339–40 (2007) (documenting the 
increasing importance of arbitration in international business relationships). 
 3. See Paul Bennett IV, Note, “Waiving” Goodbye to Arbitration: A 
Contractual Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2012) (“[A]rbitration 
EXCEEDING THEIR POWERS 1573 
agree to argue the issue before a neutral third-party arbitrator or 
panel of arbitrators and to be legally bound to honor the 
arbitrator’s decision.4 The parties decide how arbitrators are 
selected,5 and they control which issues will be resolved and which 
rules shall be applied to resolve them.6 Agreements to arbitrate are 
construed liberally to encompass almost any possible claim arising 
under them.7 These agreements, then, can even encompass 
statutory claims relating to public regulation and civil rights,8 
including discrimination claims.9 While the prevalence of 
                                                                                                     
is a private, alternative adjudicatory forum to which one gains access by 
contract” (citations omitted)); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American 
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 425–433 (1988) (noting that arbitration is a 
“creature of contract” and a popular alternative to litigation).  
 4. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of ArbitrationA Preliminary 
Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952)  
The four essential aspects of arbitration are: (1) it is resorted to only 
by agreement of the parties; (2) it is a method not of compromising 
disputes but of deciding them; (3) the person making the decision has 
no formal connection with our system of courts; but (4) before the 
award is known it is agreed to be “final and binding.”  
(citation omitted); Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 428–30 (explaining the 
arbitration process). 
 5. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a 
method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such 
method shall be followed . . . .”). 
 6. See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“[P]arties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which 
they will arbitrate, . . . so too may they specify by contract the rules under which 
that arbitration will be conducted.”). 
 7. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24–25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987) (“[The] duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a 
party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.”); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985) (“[W]e find no warrant in the [FAA] for implying in every contract within 
its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”). The Supreme 
Court has also remarked that there is nothing preventing parties from 
specifying in their agreements that statutory claims are not within the scope of 
arbitrability. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (“Nothing, in the 
meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of 
an agreement to arbitrate.”). 
 9. There is a caveat here: while courts will generally interpret broadly 
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arbitration agreements varies by context,10 it cannot be disputed 
that arbitration itself is an enormously important component in 
the field of contractual relationships, particularly commercial 
transactions.11 Considering the high stakes often involved in 
contemporary arbitration, any uncertainty regarding the validity 
of arbitral awards is at best frustrating and at worst disastrous. 
Courts have long struggled to develop a stable framework for 
review and recognition of arbitral awards.12 Early arbitral review 
                                                                                                     
worded arbitration agreements to encompass all disputes arising under the 
contract or submission, in order for a discrimination claim to be submitted to 
arbitration, the agreement must specifically mention that such claims are 
included. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (“We hold that a 
collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union 
members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”). 
 10. Arbitration agreements are commonly found in commercial deals, 
including both traditional business-to-business transactions as well as consumer 
transactions. They are also prevalent in employment contracts and the 
construction industry. For a discussion on arbitration agreements in consumer 
transactions, see Joseph M. Matthews, Consumer Arbitration: Is It Working 
Now and Will It Work in the Future?, 79-APR FLA. B.J. 22 (2005). For a 
discussion of employment arbitration, see Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., 
Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133 (2012). For a 
discussion of construction arbitration, see Greg Harwell, Arbitration of 
Construction Claims: Unique Issues and Current Topics, 25 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 
72 (2003). 
 11. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peebles, Commercial Arbitration in 
Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
343, 348 (1995)  
Increasing numbers of more complex commercial disputes, involving 
larger amounts in controversy, are being routinely submitted to 
arbitration. A substantial number of commercial contracts contain 
boilerplate arbitration clauses providing that virtually all 
controversies arising between the parties to those contracts will be 
subject to final and binding arbitration. Thus, for example, 
agreements to arbitrate contractual and related disputes are 
routinely included in sales contracts, construction contracts, broker-
customer contracts, loan agreements, partnership agreements, and 
employment and employment-related contracts. 
(citations omitted). 
 12. Before the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), federal courts 
lacked any determinative rule governing the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 125 (1924) 
(“[W]e have no occasion to consider whether the unwillingness of federal courts 
to give full effect to executory agreements for arbitration can be justified.”). 
After the FAA guaranteed the enforceability of arbitration agreements, 
questions arose as to the scope of its provisions for vacatur of awards, as well as 
the exclusivity of those provisions. Infra Part II. 
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in this country was often characterized by judicial suspicion of 
the procedural protections and legal competence provided by 
arbitration proceedings.13 Many courts were willing to vacate 
awards for any number of reasons, including the court’s belief 
that the arbitrator had misapplied the applicable law or drawn 
an incorrect legal conclusion.14  
The lack of coherency in the enforcement of arbitral awards 
was a driving force behind the passage of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA)15 in 1925. With this statute, Congress sought to 
provide a nationwide framework for the evaluation and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.16 But questions about the nature 
and scope of judicial vacatur remain unanswered to this day, 
particularly regarding substantive review and the notion of 
“manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for vacatur.17 
Although a universally accepted definition has proven 
elusive,18 manifest disregard is colloquially the notion that a court 
may vacate an arbitral award when a party can show that the 
arbitrator was aware of the applicable law but ignored it and 
applied a different standard when making her decision.19 The use 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
480 (1989) (describing the “old judicial hostility to arbitration”); Bennett, supra 
note 3, at 1623 (“Prior to the FAA, opportunities to bargain for arbitral 
procedures were severely constricted. Considered nothing more than tools of 
oppression, courts generally nullified arbitration agreements and assumed 
jurisdiction over the matter in question.” (citations omitted)). 
 14. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349–50 (1854) (stating that an 
award may be vacated for “gross mistake, either apparent on the face of the 
award, or to be made out by evidence”). 
 15. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 16. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1923) (statement of 
Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Comm. of the New York 
Chamber of Commerce) (“The fundamental conception underlying the law is to 
make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”).  
 17. See James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: 
American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party 
Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 2–6 (2007) [hereinafter Unraveling] 
(describing the creation of the manifest disregard doctrine and its current 
treatment). 
 18. See infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (detailing the different 
formulations of manifest disregard employed by the federal appellate courts). 
 19. See, e.g., Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“[A]n arbitrator acts with manifest disregard if ‘(1) the applicable 
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of manifest disregard as a concrete doctrine took hold after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan,20 yet substantive 
judicial review of arbitral awards is much older.21 Recent Supreme 
Court precedent suggests, however, that manifest disregard may 
no longer provide a valid ground for vacatur under federal law.22 A 
circuit split has developed over the continued viability of manifest 
disregard.23 
                                                                                                     
legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and 
(2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.’” (quoting Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995))); 
Matthew Wolper, “Manifest Disregard”: Not Yet Entirely Disregarded, 86-OCT 
FLA. B.J. 36, 37 (2012) (defining manifest disregard as “when an arbitrator is 
advised of the law, recognizes its applicability, and consciously disregards it” 
(citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461–62 (11th Cir. 
1997))). 
 20. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 21. James M. Gaitis traces the concept’s history back to Justice Story’s 
opinion in Klein v. Catara, 14 F.Cas. 732 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1814). Gaitis, 
Unraveling, supra note 17, at 17–23. But this case and its progeny focused on 
the distinction between restricted and unrestricted submissions to arbitration: 
restricted submissions somehow limit the arbitrator’s authority to resolve the 
dispute, while unrestricted submissions grant the arbitrator “carte blanche 
authority” to resolve the dispute however she sees fit, regardless of any 
applicable legal or equitable principles. Id. at 17. An award could be vacated 
only for a mistake in the application of law if the submission was restricted to 
that particular body of law, or in an unrestricted submission if the arbitrator 
chose to apply that particular law and did so incorrectly. Id. at 19–20. The 
current manifest disregard standard has abandoned the restricted–unrestricted 
distinction and focuses instead on the arbitrator’s knowledge of a binding legal 
principle and subsequent refusal to apply it. See id. at 54 (“[C]ourts continually 
have concluded that in using the word ‘disregard’ in Wilko, the Supreme Court 
could have only meant to describe an intentional act by arbitrators.”); supra 
note 19 (describing the current manifest disregard standard). 
 22. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the viability of manifest 
disregard. See James M. Gaitis, Clearing the Air on “Manifest Disregard” and 
Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration: A Reconciliation of Wilko, Hall Street, 
and Stolt-Nielsen, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 21, 21–22 (2011) [hereinafter Clearing 
the Air] (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to rule on manifest disregard). The 
Court has, however, called the doctrine into serious question with its ruling in 
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), causing 
several federal circuits to abandon manifest disregard. See Christopher Walsh, 
Stolt-Nielsen’s Comfort for the ‘Average Arbitrator’: An Analysis of the Post-Hall 
Street ‘Manifest Disregard’ Award Review Standard, 27 ALTS. TO HIGH COST 
LITIG. 19, 19–21 (2009) (explaining Hall Street’s effect on manifest disregard and 
lower federal courts’ reactions to the case). 
 23. Infra Part III.C. 
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This Note attempts to ameliorate some of the confusion over 
manifest disregard by proposing a new framework for evaluating 
arbitrators’ determination and application of rules governing 
disputes submitted to arbitration. The framework seeks to 
harmonize the stated goals of arbitration, concerns about 
arbitrator overreaching and unfairness, and recent confusing 
Supreme Court precedent. The goal pursued is a compromise 
between two opposing viewpoints on the courts’ role in 
arbitration: the view that courts must be allowed to monitor 
arbitration in order to prevent abuse or egregious mistakes,24 and 
the view that arbitration must remain separate from litigation 
and unrestrained by judicial imposition.25 
The Note begins by providing a brief outline of the history 
and goals behind both the manifest disregard doctrine and 
arbitration generally in Part II.26 Part III analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,27 
which cast serious doubt on manifest disregard’s continued 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error: Replacing “Manifest 
Disregard” with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, 60 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 87, 126 (2012) (“[F]ederal courts [should] apply plenary review for 
errors of law when either federal statutory rights or federal public policy is at 
stake.”); Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest 
Disregard” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 187 (2011) (“[J]udicial review must be 
available to correct an arbitrator’s intentional flouting of the law. If the 
standard is eliminated, arbitral finality will rise above the crowning principle of 
the American constitutional system: ‘No man in this country is so high that he is 
above the law.’” (citations omitted)); Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 518 
(1998) (“Judicial review of arbitration awards must be sufficient at least to 
require arbitrators to follow the general outlines of the law. An award should be 
vacated or modified if it shows an extraordinary lack of fidelity to established 
legal principles or an egregious departure from established law.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Albert G. Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It! Now What?, 29-SUM 
VT. B.J. 39, 45 (2003) [hereinafter The Arbitrator Blew It!] (claiming that 
manifest disregard transforms arbitration into “not an alternative to litigation, 
but rather the first step of the law suit”); Kevin Patrick Murphy, Alive But Not 
Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 44 GA. L. REV. 285, 314 (2009) 
(“Removing manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur makes judicial 
enforcement more predictable and, thus, less necessary.”); Hans Smit, Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 513, 520 
(2008) [hereinafter Critical Comment] (arguing against an expanded role for the 
courts in the arbitration system). 
 26. See infra Part II (discussing the goals and history of arbitration and 
manifest disregard in the U.S.). 
 27. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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viability, as well as the federal circuit split that has formed as a 
result of that decision.28 Part III also discusses the more recent 
Supreme Court case Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,29 which indicated that some manner of 
substantive arbitral award review must be available to courts.30 
Part IV introduces the Note’s solution to the circuit split: a new 
framework for judicial substantive review of arbitral awards.31 
The framework presents six questions for a judge to ask while 
reviewing an arbitrator’s decision.32 This Note concludes that 
very limited substantive review should be available to parties 
challenging an arbitral award, but only if the strict requirements 
described in the framework are met.33 The manifest disregard 
doctrine is shown to be both overinclusive and underinclusive and 
must be modified as indicated in the review framework.34 
II. Background: Historic and Contemporary Views of Arbitration 
and Manifest Disregard 
To understand the controversy over award review and 
vacatur, one must understand the history and goals of arbitration 
itself, as well as the roots of manifest disregard. The difficulty in 
reconciling one with the other stems from the inherent tension 
between their goals. Arbitration, on the one hand, seeks finality 
and expediency, while manifest disregard, on the other, seeks 
accuracy through substantive review.  
                                                                                                     
 28. See infra Parts III.A, III.C (discussing Hall Street and the current 
federal circuit split over manifest disregard). 
 29. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 30. See infra Part III.B (discussing Stolt-Nielsen). 
 31. See infra Part IV (describing a new framework for analyzing 
substantive challenges to arbitral awards). 
 32. See infra Part V.B (introducing the six-question review framework). 
 33. See infra Part VI (concluding that limited substantive review of arbitral 
awards should be available). 
 34. See infra Part VI (describing the inadequacies of the manifest disregard 
doctrine). 
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A. The Goals and History of Arbitration in the United States 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
arbitration enjoyed an important, albeit limited, role in 
commercial transactions.35 The enforceability of arbitral awards 
was not certain, though, in part due to the courts’ frequent 
refusals to honor arbitration agreements or enforce arbitral 
awards.36  
During this time period, the finality of arbitration was 
extremely questionable. The Supreme Court made it clear that 
arbitral awards could be properly reviewed for any “such reasons 
as are sufficient in other courts,” including “manifest mistake of 
law.”37  
Congress sought to ameliorate perceived judicial hostility 
toward arbitration, at the time embodied by the “ouster 
doctrine,”38 and to make arbitration a reliable dispute-resolution 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration 
in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 247–48 (1928) (explaining that before 
the FAA was enacted, state laws on arbitration varied with regard to the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, limiting arbitration’s desirability). 
 36. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1898) (“While 
parties may impose, as condition precedent to applications to the courts, that 
they shall first have settled the amount to be recovered by an agreed mode, they 
cannot entirely close the access to the courts of law. The law, and not the 
contract, prescribes the remedy . . . .”); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trin. Lake 
Petroleum Co., 22 F. 1006, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (“[T]he Supreme Court has laid 
down the rule that such a complete ouster of jurisdiction as is shown by the 
clause quoted from the charter parties is void in a federal forum.”). Judicial 
hostility toward arbitration was apparent even decades after the FAA’s passage. 
See Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Charles W. Ackerman of Fla., Inc., 219 So. 2d 110, 
113 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (“Traditionally, agreements to arbitrate have been 
strictly construed because they have the effect of ousting a court of competent 
jurisdiction of the authority to determine a question initially which will arise in 
the future.”). 
 37. United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 420 (1874). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924). The “ouster doctrine” was a 
principle used by courts to invalidate forum selection clauses in contracts. See In 
re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. L.L.C., 251 S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. App. 
2008) (explaining the ouster doctrine and tracing its origin to Ins. Co. v. Morse, 
87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874)). Arbitration agreements were invalidated alongside 
forum selection clauses because they removed disputes from all courts’ 
jurisdictions. See Patricia Patterson, In re AIU Insurance Company, 41-SPG 
TEX. J. BUS. L. 101, 102–03 (2005) (“[U]nder the ‘ouster doctrine,’ advance 
agreements regarding forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses, and venue 
clauses were considered illegal and void.”). The ouster doctrine posited that 
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mechanism for parties seeking to avoid litigation.39 The Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) created a federal framework providing for 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal district court.40 
If a federal court finds a valid arbitration agreement between the 
parties, the FAA requires the court to stay all proceedings and 
order the parties to arbitration.41 The FAA preempts any 
conflicting state laws invalidating agreements to arbitrate or 
state laws restricting arbitration more than other contracts,42 and 
its reach covers all agreements to arbitrate in commercial and 
maritime contracts43 and agreements to arbitrate in all 
employment contracts except those of transportation workers.44 
                                                                                                     
because “every citizen has a right to resort to all courts of the country,” then 
although a citizen may waive his rights in specific instances, he may not “bind 
himself by an agreement . . . thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all 
occasions.” Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).  
 39. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) 
(“Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with 
a national policy favoring it and placing arbitration agreements on equal footing 
with all other contracts.” (internal quotes omitted)). 
 40. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making agreements to arbitrate “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (explaining that the FAA created both procedural and 
substantive federal arbitration law). 
 41. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 42. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 340 U.S. 64 (1938), federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law unless 
the controversy is governed by the U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress. 
State courts and federal courts sitting in diversity cases cannot apply federal 
procedural law. The FAA is not merely a procedural statute, though. It creates 
federal substantive arbitration law as well as procedural arbitration law, and 
both federal and state courts must apply its substantive components. Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).  
FAA preemption of state law is an important topic for this Note, and will be 
discussed more thoroughly infra Part IV.D.2–4. It is now settled law that the 
FAA preempts any state law governing arbitration that singles out arbitration 
agreements for invalidation. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) 
(holding that the FAA preempted a California law vesting primary jurisdiction 
to resolve disputes between talent agents and artists to the state’s labor 
commission); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 
IND. L.J. 393, 394 n.2 (2004) (providing a list of cases in which state laws 
regulating arbitration agreements were held preempted by the FAA).  
 43. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (establishing the Act’s jurisdiction over agreements to 
arbitrate “in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce”).  
 44. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (“Section 1 
exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation 
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Disputes in those contexts can be arbitrated even when they 
involve statutorily created rights.45 Thus, the overwhelming 
majority of arbitrations in the United States fall under its 
scope.46 The FAA does not, however, actually confer federal 
jurisdiction.47 The FAA also provides the structural and 
substantive framework for the Uniform Law Commission’s 
Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act,48 on which forty-nine states have based their own arbitration 
statutes.49  
If the FAA was created to increase the use and acceptance of 
arbitration as an alternative to litigation, it has been a success. 
Arbitration clauses are found in a large portion of consumer50 and 
                                                                                                     
workers.”). 
 45. See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) 
(holding that agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1934 
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act are valid). 
 46. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (per curiam) 
(stating that the FAA’s jurisdiction extends as far as Congress’s Commerce 
Clause Power under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution); Satomi 
Owners Ass’n v. Satomi, L.L.C., 225 P.3d 213, 219 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) 
(holding that the FAA preempted a Washington statute invalidating an 
arbitration clause between a condominium developer and a homeowners’ 
association); Benjamin D. Tievsky, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act After 
Alafabco: A Case Analysis, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 675, 706–07 (2010) 
(analyzing the expansive reach of the FAA’s jurisdiction after the Alafabco 
decision). 
 47. A party seeking federal review of an arbitration agreement or award 
under the FAA must meet federal subject-matter jurisdiction requirements. See 
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009) (stating that the FAA does not 
confer federal jurisdiction). 
 48. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s 
Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2002) (“The 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) prescribe a 
nearly identical ‘arbitration law’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 49. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Acts: Arbitration 
Act (2000), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (2014), http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title 
=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (providing the text of 
the UAA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Uniform 
Arbitration Act (UAA) was promulgated in 1956 and adopted by 49 states. Id. It 
was revised in 2000, and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) has thus 
far been adopted in sixteen states. Id. 
 50. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to 
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s 
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 56 (2004) (noting the increased 
prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). 
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employment contracts,51 and have been historically common in 
business transactions.52 Arbitration proceedings have also become 
available to resolve disputes involving statutory rights, including 
civil rights.53 For better or worse, arbitration is a key component 
in our domestic dispute-resolution framework, and has expanded 
beyond its contract origins to hold an indomitable place in dispute 
resolution.54 
Throughout arbitration’s history in the United States, 
proponents have lauded its asserted advantages over litigation, 
including cost-efficiency, finality of the decision, speed, arbitrator 
expertise, privacy, and greater control over the proceedings.55 
Some judicial suspicion of the relatively unsupervised nature of 
                                                                                                     
 51. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 137 (documenting an 
increase in the use of arbitration agreements in Chief Executive Officer 
employment contracts). 
 52. See Note, Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARV. 
L. REV. 1022, 1025 (1948) [hereinafter Predictability of Result] (“By far the 
largest number of awards studied concerned mercantile questions.”). 
 53. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 266 (2009) (“This ‘Court has 
been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under 
the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving 
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.’” 
(quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001))); O’Hara 
O’Connor et al., supra note 10, at 146–47 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) for the proposition that “statutory claims 
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement”). Very few types of claims are 
categorically nonarbitrable. Criminal offenses are the most significant 
exception. See RICHARD A. LORD, 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:28 (4th ed., 
2012) (“Criminal offenses are not arbitrable, as they are matters of public 
concern.” (citations omitted)). 
 54. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court has “elevate[d] arbitration 
provisions above all other contractual provisions”). 
 55. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 618–21 (citing expediency, cost efficiency, 
and freedom to design procedures tailored to the parties’ needs as possible 
benefits of choosing arbitration over litigation); Richard W. Naimark & 
Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations 
and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW 203, 203–04 
(2002) (presenting a survey of clients and attorneys engaged in private 
commercial arbitration ranking the clients’ and attorneys’ perceived advantages 
of arbitration in order of importance); Predictability of Result, supra note 52, at 
1022 (describing arbitration to be quicker than litigation if agreed upon before 
the dispute arose); Philip G. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration Under the N.R.A., 
1 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425 (1934) (defining arbitration as the “adjudication of 
disputes by private judges of the parties’ own choosing” and the “business man’s 
substitute for trial”). 
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arbitral proceedings persists, however. From time to time, courts 
may seem unwilling to elevate the stated goals of arbitration over 
their own perception that a mistake has been made in fashioning 
the award.56 Parties left unsatisfied with an arbitrator’s decision 
will often challenge it through litigation, hoping to convince a 
court that mistake or malfeasance has occurred.  
B. Arbitral Award Vacatur 
Arbitral awards are generally not reviewable for mistakes of 
law.57 The FAA contains four enumerated grounds granting 
federal courts the authority to vacate an arbitral award.58 A court 
may vacate when it finds that the award was “procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means”; when it finds “evident 
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; when the arbitrators 
misbehave in a way that prejudices a party’s rights; or when the 
arbitrators exceed their powers.59 These grounds tend to focus on 
                                                                                                     
 56. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir. 
1998) (overturning an arbitral award because the court found that the 
arbitrators “ignored the law or the evidence or both”); Montes v. Shearson 
Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (vacating an arbitral 
award because one of the parties had expressly urged the arbitrator to disregard 
the applicable law and the court believed that the facts did not adequately 
support the award). 
 57. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) 
(stating that courts cannot provide “general review for an arbitrator’s legal 
errors”). 
 58. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
 59. Id. The full text of the provision reads: 
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating 
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration— 
 (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to 
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 
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the fairness and impartiality of the arbitration proceeding itself, 
rather than the reasonableness or propriety of the resulting 
award. 
The general lack of substantive-review allowance in the FAA 
reflects the broader goal that arbitral awards be final60 and be 
governed by the parties’ agreement.61 If arbitral awards can be 
readily reviewed on substantive grounds, then a de facto appeals 
process will be built into the system. This would, in turn, 
frustrate arbitration’s goals of expediency and finality.62 Recent 
Supreme Court precedent suggests, though, that some limited 
form of substantive review should be available.63 
                                                                                                     
subject matter submitted was not made. 
 60. See St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 
2005) (noting that there is a “strong federal policy favoring certainty and finality 
in arbitration”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Berry, 92 F. 
App’x 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is clear that the FAA reflects Congressional 
approval of the speed and finality of arbitration . . . .”); Kar Nut Prods. Co. v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 
337, No. 92-2084, 1993 WL 304467, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1993) (“Our 
deference to the judgments of arbitrators is to promote the finality of 
arbitration.” (citing Bakers Union Factory No. 326 v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 
Inc., 749 F.2d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 1984))); Naimark & Keer, supra note 55, at 204 
(noting that 32% of arbitration participants surveyed cited “finality” as one of 
their top three reasons for arbitrating their dispute). 
 61. The FAA was enacted specifically to guarantee that agreements to 
arbitrate were enforced. See Gaitis, Unraveling, supra note 17, at 42 (quoting 
Representative Graham during the 1924 Joint Hearings before the Senate and 
House Subcommittees on the Judiciary). The arbitration agreement necessarily 
includes the sacrifice of some of the substantive and procedural rights available 
through litigation in order to achieve the benefits cited in the Naimark & Keer 
article, supra note 55, at 204. See Davis, supra note 24, at 88 (elaborating on the 
procedural rights commonly forfeited in arbitration proceedings). Finality is also 
viewed as a common reason for resorting to arbitration. See United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union v. Pilgrims Pride Corp., 193 F.3d 328, 332 (5th Cir. 
1999) (“Intrusive review of arbitration awards by the courts would undermine 
the federal policy favoring labor arbitration. Such review would destroy the 
bargained-for finality of arbitration . . . .”). 
 62. Once an arbitral award is challenged, not only will the parties have to 
litigate in a district court, they will likely have to re-arbitrate the dispute if the 
award is vacated. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time 
within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the 
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”) 
 63. See infra notes 217–24 and accompanying text (describing the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen). 
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C. Summary and History of Manifest Disregard 
Courts have long been adept at finding ways to grant 
substantive review of arbitral decisions. The most common and 
perhaps most controversial method of achieving such review has 
been the manifest disregard doctrine.64 This doctrine purports to 
allow judicial vacatur of an award when a party can demonstrate 
that, when fashioning the award, the arbitrator intentionally 
ignored the clearly applicable law.65  
The intent of the arbitrator to ignore law that she perceives 
to be controlling is often a necessary component in a finding of 
manifest disregard; most courts attempt to distinguish between a 
“mere” mistake in law and manifest disregard, and the 
distinction often requires that the misapplication of law be 
egregious and with knowledge of how the law should be applied.66 
                                                                                                     
 64. See supra note 56 (citing cases applying the doctrine); see also Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P, 813 A.2d 621, 633 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (vacating for manifest disregard of the law and 
contravention of public policy an arbitral decision awarding payment for medical 
services to a then-unlicensed medical facility in clear violation of the applicable 
New Jersey statute); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 274 
(App. Div. 1st Dept. 2003) (vacating a punitive damages arbitral award because 
the court found it to be in manifest disregard of the law); Walsh, supra note 22, 
at 19 (“[I]t has been recognized since the 1950s that arbitration awards may be 
vacated if the award displays a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”).  
 65. This statement is a generalization of the manifest disregard doctrine as 
it appears in most circumstances. See Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. 
Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389–90 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A party seeking 
vacatur [for manifest disregard of the law] bears the burden of proving that the 
arbitrators were fully aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal 
principle, but refused to apply it, in effect, ignoring it.”). The court goes on to 
identify three necessary components of a manifest disregard showing: first, that 
the law was clear and explicitly applicable to the dispute before the arbitrators; 
second, that the applicable law was misapplied; and third, that the arbitrator 
was subjectively aware of the governing law yet did not apply it. Id. at 389–90.  
In reality, as will be further discussed, there is no universally accepted 
definition of manifest disregard, and courts have increasingly been using the 
term to either restate or expand upon the enumerated grounds for vacatur 
found in § 10 of the FAA, particularly the fourth, which allows vacatur when the 
arbitrator exceeds his powers. Infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. 
 66. Duferco Int’l Steel Trading, 333 F.3d at 390; see also Montes v. 
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th Cir. 1997) (“An arbitration 
board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it. It 
has simply made a legal mistake. To manifestly disregard the law, one must be 
conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.”). 
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The inherent difficulty in distinguishing what sort of 
misapplications would rise to the level of manifest disregard is 
apparent, and state67 and federal courts have been unable to 
                                                                                                     
 67. Although the focus of this Note is federal arbitral award review, it is 
worth noting that many state courts recognize the manifest disregard doctrine. 
See Design Tech, LLC v. Moriniere, No. CV126006844S, 2012 WL 3870313, at 
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2012) (“Our courts have held that claims of 
manifest disregard of the law fall within the statutory proscription of [CONN. 
GEN. STAT.] § 52-418(a)(4).”); Geissler v. Sanem, 949 P.2d 234, 238 (Mont. 1997) 
(holding that “this and future arbitration awards may be reviewed for a 
manifest disregard of the law”); Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 131 P.3d 5, 7 (Nev. 2006) (“We have previously recognized that a private 
arbitration award may be reviewed . . . [and vacated when] the arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law.”); Xtria L.L.C. v. Int’l Ins. Alliance Inc., 286 
S.W.3d 583, 594 (Tex. App. 2009) (“Under [the manifest disregard] standard, the 
arbitrator recognizes a clearly governing principle and ignores it.” (citation 
omitted)). Other states have either expressly rejected manifest disregard, see 
Comerica Bank v. Howsam, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t 
is unclear whether the manifest disregard of the law ground remains as basis 
for vacatur in federal court. . . . But one thing is clear: an arbitrator’s manifest 
disregard of the law is not a ground for vacatur under California law.”), or have 
remained ambivalent and refused to take a stance on it. See Abdelnour v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 540, 540 n.5 
(Mass. Super. 2012) (“It is unclear whether [manifest disregard] is recognized in 
Massachusetts as an additional ground for vacating an award.”). 
State courts often look to federal precedent when applying the doctrine. See 
ABCO Builders, Inc. v. Progressive Plumbing, Inc., 647 S.E.2d 574, 575 (Ga. 
2007) (“Because our state arbitration code closely tracks federal arbitration law, 
we look to federal cases for guidance in construing our own statutes.”); Wein & 
Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 480–81 (N.Y. 2006) (holding 
that courts may “modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard 
of the law” (citing Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 
F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2003))). The Georgia Supreme Court in Progressive 
Plumbing cited Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 
(11th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that “[t]o manifestly disregard the law, one 
must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it.” Id. As this Note will 
show, the federal precedent governing substantive review of arbitral awards is 
confusing and split, so resolving the issue at the federal level may influence 
state courts applying their own review procedures. The reader should remember 
that the review structure proposed by this Note is based on substantive review 
under the FAA, which only applies to federal courts. This is because the FAA 
grounds for review on which this Note’s framework is based, §§ 10–11, do not 
preempt state arbitration law. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 82 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 244 (Cal. 2008) (stating that only § 2 of the FAA applies in 
state court proceedings, and that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are directed only at 
federal courts). State courts apply their own arbitration law when reviewing 
awards, as long as the state law is not preempted by § 2 of the FAA. See, e.g., 
Nordstrom v. Russo & Steele, L.L.C., No. 1 CA–CV 11–0632, 2012 WL 2477678, 
at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 21, 2012) (applying state law mandating that 
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apply such vague standards consistently.68 This inconsistency is 
especially troubling because some courts allow the arbitrator’s 
subjective intent to be inferred from the circumstances.69 Because 
the arbitrator’s intentional disregard of controlling law tends to 
be the only clear distinction between a “mere mistake of law” and 
manifest disregard, inferring this intent from the circumstances 
hinges the whole review process on the reviewing court’s 
subjective opinion of the mistake’s enormity or the arbitrator’s 
actual knowledge of the law. 
James M. Gaitis has persuasively argued that the concepts 
underlying manifest disregard have their roots in early 
arbitration common law.70 But the emergence of manifest 
disregard as a specific doctrine of award vacatur can be traced 
directly to a small portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wilko v. Swan.71 That case, which has since been overruled, dealt 
with the question of whether an arbitration agreement contained 
                                                                                                     
appellate review of arbitral awards be available, despite a provision in the 
arbitration agreement waiving the right to such review, and reasoning that the 
FAA did not preempt state law because no federal decision has held this type of 
state law unenforceable); Wright v. City of Gary, 963 N.E.2d 637, 645 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2012) (applying manifest disregard within Indiana’s arbitration law). 
 68. See infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (describing the 
application of the manifest disregard standard among the federal circuits). 
 69. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 92–93 
(2d Cir. 2008) (stating that a court may infer an arbitrator’s knowledge of a 
controlling principle if the arbitrator’s decision “strains credulity or does not rise 
to the standard of barely colorable” (citing Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor 
Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted))), rev’d 
on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 70. See Gaitis, Clearing the Air, supra note 22, at 27 (claiming that the 
Wilko Court’s suggestion of manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur was 
based on prior American and English case law allowing for vacatur when the 
arbitrator misapplied the governing law); Gaitis, Unraveling, supra note 17, at 
16–17 (arguing that the Wilko Court found the FAA to incorporate traditional 
American arbitration common law, which allowed substantive review for 
mistakes in the application of law). 
 71. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C, 300 F. 
App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (“It is worth noting that since Wilko, every federal 
appellate court has allowed the vacatur of an award based on an arbitrator’s 
manifest disregard of the law.”); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 
1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Wilko for the proposition that “although an 
erroneous interpretation of the law would not subject an arbitration award to 
reversal, a clear disregard for the law would”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Wilko as the 
source of manifest disregard in the Second Circuit).  
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in a securities brokerage contract was an illegal waiver of a 
party’s right, under the Securities Act of 1933,72 to recover in 
state or federal court for misrepresentation.73 In dicta, the Court 
stated that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in 
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal 
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”74 In support 
of this statement, the Court referenced several nineteenth- 
century cases applying substantive review to awards for an 
arbitrator’s mistake in the application of law that rose above a 
mere mistake in judgment.75 
As Gaitis points out, the Wilko Court’s references to older, 
pre-FAA cases have been largely forgotten, and courts as well as 
scholars have generally traced the manifest disregard doctrine to 
the Wilko dicta.76 The first attempt to define what the Wilko 
Court meant by “manifest disregard” arose in the Ninth Circuit’s 
San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay 
Terminals Ltd.77 decision, although the court did not officially 
adopt the standard.78 Citing Wilko, the court concluded that 
manifest disregard  
                                                                                                     
 72. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (“Any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations 
of the Commission shall be void.”). 
 73. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953), overruled by Rodrigues de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 74. Id. at 436–37 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 437 n.24 (citing United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 413, 419–
21 (1874); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854); and Klein v. Catara, 14 F. 
Cas. 732, 735 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1814)). 
 76. See Weathers P. Bolt, Much Ado About Nothing: The Effect of Manifest 
Disregard on Arbitration Agreement Decisions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 161, 164 (2011) 
(“Courts continued to recognize the strict rules of the FAA regarding vacatur 
until the Supreme Court opened the door to possibly recognizing non-statutory 
grounds for vacating an arbitration award in Wilko.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); Davis, supra note 24, at 89 (tracing the creation of the 
manifest disregard in the federal circuits to the Wilko opinion); Gaitis, Clearing 
the Air, supra note 22, at 23 (“Prior to the advent of the twenty-first century, 
arbitration law commentators almost universally and incorrectly surmised that 
the manifest disregard concept originated in the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Wilko v. Swan.” (citations omitted)); supra note 71 (citing cases that 
trace the manifest disregard doctrine to Wilko).  
 77. 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 78. See id. at 801 (declining to adopt a standard of review for manifest 
disregard of the law). 
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must be something beyond and different from a mere error in 
the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand 
or apply the law. . . . We apprehend that a manifest disregard 
of the law in the context of the language used in Wilko v. 
Swan . . . might be present when arbitrators understand and 
correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same.79 
The Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to 
clearly adopt the manifest disregard standard when it decided 
Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc. in 
1967.80 The Third Circuit followed suit in 1969 with its ruling in 
Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher.81 The other 
federal circuits, one by one, adopted the manifest disregard 
standard throughout the remaining decades of the twentieth 
century.82 The Fifth Circuit was the final holdout, adopting 
manifest disregard in a 1999 decision, Williams v. Cigna 
Financial Advisors Inc.83 
By 2008, the year that the Supreme Court decided Hall 
Street,84 every federal circuit had ostensibly adopted the doctrine. 
Their use of the manifest disregard doctrine was far from 
consistent, though. The federal circuit positions can be divided 
roughly into two distinct camps, with a few outliers. 
The first and larger camp consists of the circuits that allowed 
a reviewing judge to somehow infer the arbitrator’s knowledge of 
the governing law and intent to disregard it. The Second Circuit 
applied probably the most lenient standard out of any circuit in 
its Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.85 opinion. After stating that “we 
doubt whether even under a strict construction of the meaning of 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967). “[T]he Supreme Court has held in Wilko v. 
Swan . . . that an award, based on ‘manifest disregard’ of the law, will not be 
enforced . . . .” Id. at 582 (citing Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d at 801). 
 81. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969). “[I]nterpretations of labor arbitrators 
must not be disturbed so long as they are not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the 
law . . . .” Id. at 1128 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)). 
 82. For a complete listing of the cases in which the federal circuits adopted 
the manifest disregard standard, see LeRoy, supra note 24, at 159. 
 83. 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled by Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. 
v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 84. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (describing the impact of 
the Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision). 
 85. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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manifest disregard, it is necessary for arbitrators to state that 
they are deliberately ignoring the law,” the court went on to find 
that the arbitrators did manifestly disregard the law based on 
“strong evidence” supporting a conclusion opposite to the 
arbitrators’ determination, along with “the agreement of the 
parties that the arbitrators were correctly advised of the 
applicable legal principles.”86 It is striking to note that this court 
suggested not only manifest disregard of the law, but the 
evidence as well, could serve as a ground for vacatur.87 The First 
Circuit required that, in order for manifest disregard to be shown 
without an express admission from the arbitrators that they 
disregarded the law, “the governing law [must] have such 
widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable 
applicability that a court could assume the arbitrators knew the 
rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug.”88 The Fourth 
Circuit initially devoted little effort to explaining what it 
considered manifest disregard to entail,89 but finally elucidated a 
test in 2008 by requiring that the arbitration record show that 
the applicable legal principle was clearly defined, not subject to 
reasonable debate, and that the arbitrator refused to apply it.90 
The Sixth Circuit also allowed a court to infer an arbitrator’s 
subjective knowledge and disregard of applicable legal principles 
if it determined that “no judge or group of judges could 
conceivably come to the same determination as the arbitrator.”91  
The second camp is composed of circuits that adopted a more 
conservative form of manifest disregard and did not allow courts 
to infer knowledge of governing law on the part of the arbitrator. 
In order to show manifest disregard, the party had to conclusively 
show that the arbitrator identified the governing law and yet 
failed to apply it. The Eighth Circuit held this consistent, 
                                                                                                     
 86. Id. at 204. 
 87. Id. (“In view of the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of 
his age and the agreement of the parties that the arbitrators were correctly 
advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to hold that they 
ignored the law or the evidence or both.”). 
 88. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 89. LeRoy, supra note 24, at 163. 
 90. Long John Silver’s Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 349–50 (4th Cir. 
2008). 
 91. Id. 
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conservative form of manifest disregard for two decades: “[A]n 
arbitration decision only manifests disregard for the law where 
the arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and 
then proceed to ignore it.”92 The Tenth Circuit applied a 
formulation of manifest disregard that closely tracked the Eighth 
Circuit’s conservative approach. It held manifest disregard to 
mean “willful inattentiveness to governing law,”93 and to invoke 
this standard, the “record [must] show the arbitrators knew the 
law and explicitly disregarded it.”94 The Eleventh Circuit initially 
refused to adopt manifest disregard at all.95 But by 1997, it too 
had decided to apply the more conservative form of the doctrine.96  
Several of the circuits did not fit neatly into those two 
groups. These circuits took either unclear or singular positions. 
The Third Circuit initially focused its examination on the 
arbitration agreement itself, as opposed to governing law 
identified in the agreement, stating that “only where there is a 
manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by 
principles of contract construct and the law of the shop, may a 
reviewing court disturb the award.”97 This circuit later relied on a 
definition in the negative: that manifest disregard was not an 
“erroneous interpretation” of the law.98 The relatively few cases 
addressing manifest disregard in the Third Circuit do not 
definitively state whether a court could infer the arbitrator’s 
knowledge. While the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to 
articulate a standard for manifest disregard in Saguenay 
                                                                                                     
 92. Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
 93. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
 94. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 95. See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 
1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990) (“This court has never adopted the manifest-
disregard-of-the-law standard; indeed, we have expressed some doubt as to 
whether it should be adopted . . . .”). 
 96. See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (recognizing manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur, defining it 
using Black’s Law Dictionary, and stating that “[t]o manifestly disregard the 
law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it”). 
 97. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969).  
 98. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Terminals Ltd.,99 it did not actually adopt the doctrine until 
1982,100 and it was not until 1995 that the court attempted to 
further define standards for applying the doctrine.101 Although 
the Ninth Circuit’s standard was fairly traditional, it also did not 
state whether or not an arbitrator’s subjective knowledge of the 
applicable law could be inferred.102 The Fifth Circuit suggested 
perhaps the most liberal version of manifest disregard when it 
stated that “where on the basis of the information available to the 
court it is manifest that the arbitrators acted contrary to the 
applicable law, the award should be upheld unless it would result 
in a significant injustice.”103 Notice that this standard does not 
consider the arbitrator’s subjective knowledge of the applicable 
law, but instead requires the court, upon a finding of manifest 
disregard, to determine whether upholding the award would 
“result in [a] significant injustice.”104 The Seventh Circuit has 
historically been critical of the manifest disregard doctrine.105 It 
ostensibly applied the doctrine in its Wise v. Wachovia Securities, 
LLC106 decision, but defined the doctrine so narrowly as to be 
                                                                                                     
 99. San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals 
Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 100. See Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 
1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts are bound to defer to the conclusions of the 
arbitrator unless the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law.”).  
 101. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“It must be clear from the record that the arbitrators recognized the 
applicable law and ignored it.” (citations omitted)). Before this case, the Ninth 
Circuit had only applied the standard suggested in Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 
which defined manifest disregard largely in the negative. See, e.g., Thompson v. 
Tega-Rand Int’l, 740 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (defining manifest disregard 
as “something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on 
the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law” (quoting Saguenay 
Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d at 801)). 
 102. The Ninth Circuit does not state that an arbitrator’s subjective 
knowledge of applicable law and intent to disregard it can be inferred, but it 
does cite the Second Circuit, which has allowed such an inference. See Mich. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d at 832 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 103. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  
 104. Id. at 762.  
 105. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon, & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 708 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (claiming that the manifest disregard doctrine is either “inconsistent 
with the entire law of arbitration” or “superfluous and confusing”).  
 106. 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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superfluous.107 The D.C. Circuit adopted a rather lenient 
standard, but one that appeared applicable only to statutory 
rights. Stating that the “manifest disregard of the law standard 
must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have 
properly interpreted and applied statutory law,” the court seems 
to have contemplated judicial review for a “mere error in law” 
when dealing with arbitral awards implicating statutory 
rights.108 
So the state of manifest disregard was unclear even before 
Hall Street. In its Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy109 decision, the First 
Circuit listed several formulations of manifest disregard 
standards used in other circuits.110 The court then claimed that 
the differences were purely superficial: “However nattily 
wrapped, the packages are fungible.”111 That claim’s accuracy is 
questionable; the manifest disregard doctrine appeared confused 
and inconsistent.112 Some circuits allowed the arbitrator’s 
subjective knowledge and intent to be inferred from the 
circumstances of the case.113 Others required explicit recognition 
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. at 268–69 (“[W]e have defined ‘manifest disregard of the law’ so 
narrowly that it fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory 
ground-‘where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.’ . . . For we have confined 
it to cases in which the arbitrators ‘direct the parties to violate the law.’” 
(quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 
2001))). 
 108. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 
also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (stating that an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the law is not reviewable); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Jarros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[M]anifest disregard of 
the law is a very narrow standard of review. . . . A mere error in interpretation 
or application of the law is insufficient.”); Thompson v. Tega-Rand Int’l, 740 
F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Manifest disregard of the law has been defined as 
‘something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the 
part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.’” (quoting San Martine 
Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminal Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th 
Cir. 1961))). 
 109. 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 110. Id. at 9. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (detailing the pre-2008 
formulations of manifest disregard used in the federal circuits). 
 113. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (examining the First and 
Second Circuits); supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (examining the 
Fourth Circuit); supra note 103 and accompanying text (examining the Fifth 
Circuit); supra note 91 and accompanying text (examining the Sixth Circuit); 
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of applicableyet ignoredlegal principles.114 The Fifth Circuit 
was apparently willing to vacate awards without even a showing 
that the arbitrator was aware of the applicable law.115 The 
Seventh Circuit refused to apply the substance of the doctrine, 
yet still claimed to recognize manifest disregard.116 This 
confusing situation became even murkier following the Supreme 
Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, 
Inc.117 
III. Hall Street & The Current State of Manifest Disregard 
A. The Hall Street Decision 
The Hall Street case revolved around the validity of a clause 
in the parties’ arbitration agreement purporting to require a 
reviewing court to “vacate, modify, or correct any award if the 
arbitrator’s conclusions of law were erroneous.”118 The petitioner, 
Hall Street Associates, owned property that it had leased to the 
respondent, Mattel.119 The lease required Mattel to indemnify 
Hall Street for any damages resulting from either Mattel’s or its 
predecessors’ failure to follow environmental laws while leasing 
Hall Street’s property.120  
The Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (Water Quality 
Act)121 contained testing requirements that Mattel did not follow, 
and it was eventually discovered that Mattel’s predecessor had 
contaminated the property.122 Mattel sought to terminate the 
lease, while Hall Street sued to enforce the indemnification 
                                                                                                     
supra note 107 and accompanying text (examining the D.C. Circuit). 
 114. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (examining the Eighth 
Circuit); supra notes 93–94 (examining the Tenth Circuit); supra notes 95–96 
and accompanying text (examining the Eleventh Circuit). 
 115. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 116. Supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Hall Street case).  
 118. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 576 (2008). 
 119. Id. at 579. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act, O.R.S. § 448.155 to 448.330 
(2012). 
 122. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579. 
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clause.123 The parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute and drew up 
an agreement containing the above-mentioned judicial review 
clause.124 
The arbitrator found that Mattel was not required to 
indemnify Hall Street because he did not believe that the Water 
Quality Act was an environmental statute; he characterized it as 
a human-health law.125 Hall Street sought review in federal court 
pursuant to the judicial review clause. Hall Street claimed that 
the arbitrator had made an erroneous conclusion of law and the 
district court agreed, finding that the Water Quality Act was an 
environmental law. The court vacated the award126 and on 
remand, the arbitrator found for Hall Street.127 Mattel then 
attacked the validity of the review clause itself, claiming that the 
statutory grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA were exclusive.128 
The Ninth Circuit,129 and then the Supreme Court,130 agreed 
with Mattel. The Court held “that §§ 10 and 11 respectively 
provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and 
modification.”131 The clause in the arbitration agreement granting 
expanded review to the court was invalid. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter rejected Hall Street’s 
argument that judicial review beyond the FAA’s statutory 
grounds has been available since the Wilko decision.132 Hall 
Street argued that Wilko left open the possibility for such review, 
particularly manifest disregard.133 If judges could expand review 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 580. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 580–81 (explaining that Mattel relied on the Ninth Circuit’s then-
recent ruling in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bach Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 
987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 129. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476, 477–78 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the FAA’s grounds for vacatur are exclusive), rev’d 
on other grounds, 552 U.S. 576, 592 (2008). 
 130. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008) (holding 
that the statutory grounds listed under the FAA provide the exclusive grounds 
for vacatur). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 584–85. 
 133. Id. at 584 (stating Hall Street took the position “that expandable 
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beyond the enumerated grounds in the FAA, then, Hall Street 
posited, parties should be able to expand upon those grounds as 
well.134 The Supreme Court made it clear that neither judges nor 
parties have such authority and questioned the validity of the 
manifest disregard doctrine.135 Perhaps, the Court suggested, 
manifest disregard as used in Wilko “merely referred to the § 10 
grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. . . . Or, as some 
courts have thought, ‘manifest disregard’ may have been 
shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing 
vacatur when the arbitrators were ‘guilty of misconduct’ or 
‘exceeded their powers.’”136  
To some, this case represented both a foray into new FAA 
territory for the Court as well as a departure from precedent.137 
Stuart M. Widman, an arbitration practitioner and commentator, 
argued that the FAA can be divided into roughly three parts: 
§§ 2–4, which cover entering arbitration; §§ 5 and 7, which govern 
the arbitration proceeding itself; and §§ 9–11, which cover getting 
out of arbitration.138 Prior to Hall Street, the Supreme Court had 
primarily addressed the first part—the issues involved in 
entering arbitration.139 Hall Street represented one of its first 
rulings on the sections dealing with getting out of arbitration, so 
it had limited precedent for guidance.140 The Hall Street Court 
                                                                                                     
judicial review authority has been accepted as the law since Wilko v. Swan”). 
 134. Id. at 585 (“Hall Street sees this supposed addition to § 10 as the 
camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting 
parties.”). 
 135. Id. (stating that Wilko cannot be read to create room for extra-statutory 
grounds of judicial vacatur).  
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Stuart M. Widman, Hall Street v. Mattel: The Supreme 
Court’s Alternate Arbitration Universes, 15 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 24, 26 
(2008) (analyzing Supreme Court FAA precedent pre-Hall Street). 
 138. See id (parsing the FAA into three main areas of coverage). 
 139. See id. (citing numerous Supreme Court cases applying or interpreting 
§§ 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA).  
 140. Id. Two exceptions to this general statement are First Options of 
Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), and Mastrobuono v. Shearson, Lehman 
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which both dealt with post-arbitration conflicts. 
Widman, supra note 137, at 26 n.5. These cases provided little support for the 
Hall Street decision, though, because they were both resolved by deciding issues 
presented in the context of entering arbitration: Kaplan revolved around who 
could decide arbitrability, and Mastrobuono dealt with choice of law issues. Id.  
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was clear in enunciating the “national policy favoring 
arbitration”141 that it had espoused in many prior decisions.142 
The Court also, however, seemed to break from its previous 
position regarding the parties’ power of contract in controlling the 
arbitration.143 Although courts make arbitrability decisions under 
federal arbitration law,144 the Supreme Court has held that 
parties may agree to allow the arbitrator to determine 
arbitrability himself if the parties’ agreement on this point is 
“clear and unmistakable.”145 Hall Street seems to retreat from the 
emphasis on the parties’ agreement inherent in the “clear and 
unmistakable” standard and instead sets an impressive roadblock 
against parties seeking expanded judicial review of arbitration 
awards.146  
Widman suggests that this disparate treatment of the 
parties’ power of contract may stem from the distinction between 
rules governing the arbitration proceeding itself and the rules in 
federal courts conducting review of arbitral awards.147 If true, 
then the Court may have weighed policy rationales to reach the 
Hall Street result: power of contract against finality of arbitration 
                                                                                                     
 141. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). 
 142. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006) (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) . . . . Section 2 embodies the national policy 
favoring arbitration . . . .”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (stating that there exists a “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements” (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))). 
 143. Widman, supra note 137, at 26–27. 
 144. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986) (“[T]he question of arbitrability—whether a collective-bargaining 
agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance—
is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.”). 
 145. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (“The 
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to 
arbitration . . . is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly 
and unmistakably provide otherwise.” (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 
649)). 
 146. See Widman, supra note 137, at 26–27 (“The Supreme Court signal is 
clear, however: Hall Street has pulled back from the power-of-contract rationale 
espoused in Howsam and Bazzle.”). 
 147. See id. at 26 (“Perhaps the Court did not feel that Howsam and Bazzle 
applied because they dealt with ‘getting-in’ issues, whereas Hall Street dealt 
with a ‘getting-out’ issue.”). 
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(an issue that is of less concern when deciding arbitrability itself); 
and found finality the more pressing concern.148 It may also be 
possible that the Court simply chafed at the idea of private 
parties exercising control over the federal judiciary. In the 
Supreme Court’s eyes, the FAA’s contractual imperative seems to 
end when parties start telling judges what rules they must or 
must not apply. 
Whatever the Court’s motives for its decision, Hall Street had 
an enormous impact on the manifest disregard doctrine.149 
Manifest disregard, which had generally been considered an 
extra-statutory ground for vacatur,150 appeared dead to many 
initial commentators.151 Yet the Court’s equivocal language led 
some to believe that the doctrine was not entirely foreclosed.152 
                                                                                                     
 148. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) 
(“[I]t makes more sense to see the three provisions, §§ 9–11, as substantiating a 
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to 
maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 149. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
Hall Street Court dealt with Hall Street’s manifest disregard argument.) 
 150. See, e.g., Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 
2001) (stating that manifest disregard is a “judicially crafted exception to the 
general rule that arbitrators’ erroneous interpretations or applications of law 
are not reversible” (internal quotes omitted)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (“‘Manifest disregard of 
the law’ by arbitrators is a judicially-created ground for vacating their 
arbitration award . . . . It is not to be found in the federal arbitration law.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Albert G. Besser, Arbitration Vacatur: The Supreme Court 
Bars One Route and Muddles the Other—Manifest Mistake Is Dead!, 34 VT. B.J. 
67, 68 (2008) [hereinafter Manifest Mistake Is Dead!] (“May ‘manifest disregard 
of the law’ rest in peace!”); Mauricio Gomm-Santos & Quinn Smith, On 
Dangerous Footing: the Non-Statutory Standards for Reviewing an Arbitral 
Award, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 353, 367 (2007) (“While proponents of the 
standard can point to the use of manifest disregard as a standard of review 
throughout the country, the language of the Hall Street decision casts serious 
doubt on the logical foundation for the standard’s existence.”); Robert O. 
Sheridan, All Almost Quiet on the Expanded Review Front: Supreme Court 
Rejects Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 13 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93, 107 (2008) (“In striking down ‘manifest disregard,’ the 
Hall Street Court struck a blow to Pro-Expansionists.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Smit, Critical Comment, supra note 25, at 520 (“[T]he 
prevailing view appears to be that some form of manifest disregard of the law 
currently exists as a ground for judicial review apart from those statutorily 
enumerated. Justice Souter’s speculation [in Hall Street] may prove inadequate 
to overcome this prevailing view.”); Widman, supra note 137, at 29 (“While it 
may be tempting to view Hall Street as a definitive answer, it reflects only, at 
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B. The Stolt-Nielsen Decision 
The Supreme Court had the chance to bury manifest 
disregard once and for all when it agreed to hear Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. The case involved a 
direct challenge to an arbitrator’s decision; specifically, the 
petitioner challenged an arbitration panel’s determination that 
class arbitration was allowable under the parties’ arbitration 
agreement, even though both parties stipulated that the 
agreement was silent on the matter.153 The case presented a 
perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to make a decisive 
ruling on manifest disregard because the district court had 
actually found the arbitrator’s decision to be in manifest 
disregard of the law and had vacated it accordingly.154 But a 
decisive ruling was not meant to be.155 Instead, the Court upheld 
the district court’s decision without actually pronouncing 
anything definitive, or even helpful, about its stance on manifest 
disregard. 
The petitioners in Stolt-Nielsen were shipping companies, 
including Stolt-Nielsen, that had shipped liquids in small 
quantities for their customers.156 The petitioners and customers 
all used similar or identical maritime contracts,157 which 
contained standardized arbitration clauses.158 A Department of 
                                                                                                     
best, a halftime score, with much more left to play.”). 
 153. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765–66 
(2010). 
 154. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
386 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The Court finds, therefore, that the arbitrators manifestly 
disregarded a well defined rule of governing maritime law that precluded class 
arbitration under the clauses here in issue and that their decision to the 
contrary must therefore be reversed.”), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 155. See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text (explaining Stolt-
Nielsen’s holding and treatment of manifest disregard).  
 156. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 157. See id. at 1764–65 (describing the maritime contracts, or “charter 
parties,” used by the parties in this case). 
 158. See id. at 1765 (giving an example of the arbitration clause found in one 
of the common charter parties, the Vegoilvoy charter party). The agreement 
stipulated that any dispute would be settled in New York by a panel of three 
arbitrators “experienced in the shipping business,” and that the arbitration 
would be conducted according to the provisions of the FAA. Id. 
1600 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571 (2014) 
Justice investigation discovered that the petitioner shipping 
companies were engaged in illegal price-fixing, and the 
petitioners’ customers, including AnimalFeeds, brought suit in 
federal court for antitrust damages.159 The Second Circuit ruled 
that these claims were subject to the parties’ respective 
arbitration agreements; AnimalFeeds and petitioners then agreed 
that they would arbitrate their disputes.160 AnimalFeeds, 
however, sought to enter class arbitration against all the 
petitioners at once.161 If that were allowed, AnimalFeeds would 
represent a class of “all direct purchasers of parcel tanker 
transportation services . . . from petitioners” at any time during 
the price-fixing conspiracy.162 
AnimalFeeds and petitioners agreed that their respective 
arbitration agreements did not address whether class arbitration 
was allowable.163 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,164 which held that, as an 
initial matter, the arbitrator decides whether or not an 
arbitration agreement allows class arbitration, the issue of class 
action arbitrability for the antitrust claims was submitted to a 
panel of arbitrators for determination.165 Noting that arbitrators 
in post-Bazzle arbitrations had “construed a wide variety of 
clauses in a wide variety of settings as allowing for class 
arbitration,” and concluding that petitioners’ expert evidence “did 
not show an intent to preclude class arbitration,”166 the panel 
concluded that class arbitration was permitted under the 
arbitration clause and allowed the class action against Stolt-
Nielson and the other shipping companies to move forward.167 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 
87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)). 
 163. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 
(2010). 
 164. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). The plurality in that case held 
that as an initial matter, the arbitrator determines whether or not an 
arbitration agreement allows class arbitration. Id. at 452–53. 
 165. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765–66. 
 166. Id. at 1766. 
 167. Id. 
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The shipping companies sought review of this determination 
in federal court.168 The District Court for the Southern District of 
New York concluded that the arbitrators had “manifestly 
disregarded” the clearly applicable law by failing to apply either 
the federal maritime principle that precluded class arbitration, or 
New York law, which would have incorporated the 
aforementioned maritime principle.169 The court found that the 
arbitrators had misinterpreted Bazzle170 and failed to do any 
meaningful choice of law analysis.171 The contracts at issue were 
governed by federal maritime law and New York state law.172 
Supreme Court precedent dictates that in admiralty disputes, 
courts apply state law unless there is an established federal 
maritime rule, which there was in this case.173 Because the 
arbitrator panel had applied neither federal maritime law nor 
New York law, the court vacated its decision.174 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and ordered denial of 
the petition to vacate.175 The appellate court was clear in 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386–
87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the arbitrators disregarded two sources of 
applicable law), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
The court found that the arbitrators disregarded both an established maritime 
rule forbidding class arbitration as well as New York case law, found in Evans v. 
Famous Music Corp., 807 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 2004), which held that “industry 
custom and practice” should be used when interpreting ambiguous contracts. 
Stolt-Nielsen, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. The industry custom in this case would 
have been, of course, the maritime prohibition on class arbitration. Id. 
 170. Id. at 384 (“[The Panel asserts] that resolution of the foregoing issue . . . 
is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in [Bazzle] . . . . But, even if, as the 
Panel suggests, the parties agree that Bazzle governs the issue, that underlying 
assertion is plainly wrong, and no agreement can make it right . . . .”). 
 171. Id. at 384–85  
[T]he Panel, proceeding on the mis-assumption that Bazzle controlled 
the issue of whether the clauses here permitted class actions, failed to 
make any meaningful choice-of-law analysis but simply made vague 
and passing reference to its belief that its analysis . . . is consistent 
with New York law . . . and with federal maritime law. 
 172. See id. at 385–86 (explaining that federal maritime law and New York 
state law govern the contracts between the parties). 
 173. See id. at 385 (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 
U.S. 310, 316–17 (1955)). 
 174. Id. at 386–87. 
 175. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 102 (2d Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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explaining that manifest disregard was still an appropriate 
ground for vacatur in the Second Circuit.176 They took issue, 
however, with the district court’s application of the manifest 
disregard doctrine.177 After analyzing the arbitration panel’s 
decision, the court concluded that because “Stolt-Nielsen ha[d] 
cited no federal maritime law or New York State law establishing 
a rule of construction prohibiting class arbitration where the 
arbitration clause is silent on that issue[,] [t]he . . . decision to 
construe the contract language . . . to permit class arbitration was 
therefore not in manifest disregard of the law.”178 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld 
the district court’s initial determination that allowing class 
arbitration in this circumstance was improper.179 The Court’s 
decision was based on the arbitrators’ failure to properly consult 
federal maritime law, New York state law, or the FAA and its 
rules of decision.180 The Court chastised the arbitration panel for 
“imposing its own policy choice,” and held that it had “exceeded 
its powers,” one of the enumerated grounds for vacatur under 
§ 10(a) of the FAA.181  
This holding seemed to raise more questions than it 
answered—chief among them: what about manifest disregard? 
The doctrine had been the foundation for both the district court’s 
and Second Circuit’s opinions, but it was barely mentioned in 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion182 and was completely absent 
from Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.183 The majority noted the Second 
Circuit’s continued use of the doctrine after Hall Street, and then 
cryptically stated in a footnote: “We do not decide whether 
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street as an 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 93–95 (explaining that the Second Circuit believes manifest 
disregard survived the Hall Street decision and remains a viable ground for 
vacatur). 
 177. See id. at 95–101 (analyzing the arbitral award under the Circuit’s 
formulation of the manifest disregard standard). 
 178. Id. at 101 (citation omitted). 
 179. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1777 
(2010). 
 180. Id. at 1770. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. at 1766 (acknowledging that both the district court and Second 
Circuit had based their decisions on manifest disregard). 
 183. Id. at 1777–83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the 
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”184 So 
not only did the Court refuse to make any pronouncement on the 
doctrine’s fate, but also it suggested a possibility completely at 
odds with its holding in Hall Street. How could manifest 
disregard survive as an “independent ground for review” when 
Hall Street explicitly held that there are no grounds for review 
independent of §§ 10 and 11?185 To add a final dash of confusion, 
the Court ended the footnote by musing that “[a]ssuming, 
arguendo, that [manifest disregard] applies, we find it satisfied 
for the reasons that follow.”186 So if manifest disregard does exist, 
then implicitly the Second Circuit is applying it incorrectly.  
The Stolt-Nielsen opinion has been viewed by some courts 
and commentators as an approval and application of manifest 
disregard by the Supreme Court.187 While a convenient 
interpretation for proponents of manifest disregard, it does not do 
the opinion justice. The Supreme Court clearly found that the 
arbitrators had failed to apply the applicable law. But instead of 
finding that the arbitrators recognized a controlling legal 
principle and ignored it, the Supreme Court vacated the award 
based on the arbitrators’ failure to apply a legal principle from an 
appropriate body of law.188 This is not a manifest disregard 
standard under any traditional definition.189 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at 1768 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 185. See supra notes 129–36 (explaining the holding in Hall Street). 
 186. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 
(2010). 
 187. See Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen closely tracked the 
majority of circuits’ approach to manifest disregard before Hall 
Street. It noted that there was law clearly on point, that the panel did 
not apply the applicable law, and that the panel acknowledged that it 
was departing from the applicable law. 
See also Sotheby’s Int’l Realty Inc. v. Relocation Group LLC, Civil Action No. 12-
01322-WGY, 2013 WL 6704876 at *4 n.4 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2013) (“Since the 
advent of Hall Street, however, the Second Circuit has interpreted manifest 
disregard to be a mere “judicial gloss” on the provisions found within 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10. . . . The Supreme Court has expressly declined to temper the Second 
Circuit’s appraisal.”).  
 188. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768–69  
Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York 
law contains a ‘default rule’ under which an arbitration clause is 
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Both the district and appellate opinions also focused on the 
parties’ agreement that either federal maritime law or New York 
State law governed the issue.190 The Supreme Court noted this 
fact,191 but instead decided the case based on the FAA itself.192 
Specifically, the Supreme Court cited many of its own decisions 
for the general proposition that arbitration is a creature of 
contract between the parties, and that the contract serves to limit 
the roles of arbitrators and courts.193 From there, the Court 
extrapolated the principle that “a party may not be compelled 
under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a 
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”194 
The Court had shifted from Hall Street and seemed to be 
operating from a purely contractual viewpoint, pronouncing the 
                                                                                                     
construed as allowing class arbitration in the absence of express 
consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-
law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in 
such a situation. 
The Court found that instead of looking to governing bodies of law, the 
arbitration panel based its decision on a “consensus among arbitrators that class 
arbitration is beneficial in a wide variety of settings.” Id. at 1769. The 
arbitrators did not intentionally ignore legal principles that they accepted as 
governing; they simply did not recognize any governing legal principles at all, so 
instead applied their own policy judgment. Id. 
 189. See supra Part II.C (describing the general manifest disregard standard 
and different formulations applied in the federal circuits). 
 190. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (analyzing the dispute under both federal maritime law 
and New York State law), rev’d, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 
(2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen’s arbitration brief, which stated that even though 
Stolt-Nielsen believed federal maritime law should govern the dispute, and 
AnimalFeeds believed New York law should govern, the disagreement should 
not make a difference because the result under either law would be the same). 
 191. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 (stating that the arbitrators should 
have resolved the issue by looking “either to the FAA itself or to one of the two 
bodies of law that the parties claimed were governing, i.e., either federal 
maritime law or New York law”). 
 192. Id. at 1764 (“We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether 
imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on 
that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et 
seq.”). 
 193. Id. at 1774–75 (quoting numerous Supreme Court cases dealing with 
arbitration). 
 194. Id. at 1775. 
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“foundational principle of the FAA that arbitration is a matter of 
consent.”195 
C. The Current Federal Circuit Split Over Manifest Disregard 
So where do Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen leave manifest 
disregard? Given that a universally accepted definition of the 
doctrine had already proven elusive,196 it should come as no 
surprise that these decisions have only exacerbated the problem.  
Before Hall Street, all of the federal circuits had (at least 
ostensibly) adopted the manifest disregard doctrine. The 
Supreme Court’s holding and criticism of the doctrine prompted 
several circuits to abandon it altogether. The Fifth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits concluded that Hall Street completely 
abrogated the doctrine because it had been viewed as an extra-
statutory ground for vacatur.197  
Other circuits held fast to the doctrine, most notably the 
Second Circuit, as it made clear in its Stolt-Nielsen opinion.198 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have joined its position, 
agreeing that manifest disregard can survive Hall Street.199 The 
                                                                                                     
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (summarizing 
differences between federal circuits’ applications of manifest disregard). 
 197. See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner, 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 
2010) (“Appellant’s claims, including the claim that the arbitrator disregarded 
the law, are not included among those specifically enumerated in § 10 and are 
therefore not cognizable.”); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“We hold that our judicially-created bases for vacatur are no 
longer valid in light of Hall Street.”); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 
F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Hall Street unequivocally held that the statutory 
grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under the FAA. Our case law 
defines manifest disregard of the law as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur. 
Thus . . . it is no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA.”). 
 198. Supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]e find that manifest disregard continues to exist either as an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss . . . .”); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. 
Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have already determined that 
the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is shorthand for a statutory ground 
under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which states that the court may 
vacate “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. 
WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]his Court will follow its 
well-established precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’ 
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Seventh Circuit has also continued to apply its own extremely 
conservative (and probably superfluous)200 form of the doctrine.201  
Still other circuits remain understandably perplexed by the 
Supreme Court’s confusing treatment of the doctrine, and so have 
decided to wait on the sidelines. The First, Third, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuits have yet to take a firm stance on whether or not 
manifest disregard remains viable.202 This last category of 
jurisdictions is the most troubling because the lower courts are 
left without guidance and districts within the same circuit reach 
opposite conclusions.203  
                                                                                                     
standard.”).  
 200. See supra notes 105–07 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s extremely 
narrow version of manifest disregard). 
 201. See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281, 
285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George Watts & Son, 
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may reject an 
arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”). The George Watts & 
Son standard is articulated supra in note 107. 
 202. See Bangor Gas Co., LLC v. H.Q. Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc., 695 F.3d 
181, 187 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that the First Circuit has merely expressed in 
dicta that manifest disregard does not appear to survive Hall Street); Affinity 
Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (refusing to 
decide whether manifest disregard survives Hall Street, because the arbitration 
award before the court did not rise to the level of manifest disregard); Abbot v. 
Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612, 619 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n 
the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme Court, we decline to decide 
whether the manifest disregard standard should be entirely jettisoned.”); Paul 
Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, LLC v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172, 176–77 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“In the wake of Hall Street, a circuit split has emerged regarding 
whether manifest disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur. This 
Court has not yet entered that debate.”).  
 203. Compare Santomeno v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., Civ. No. 2:12-3782 
(KM), 2013 WL 103392, at *8 n.7 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2013) (“Because Hall Street did 
not squarely address the issue [of manifest disregard] and the Third Circuit 
declined to rule on these common law grounds for review, I will assume that 
they survive.”), with Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. SOC-SMG, Inc., Civil Action No. 
11-6008, 2012 WL 5232180, at *5 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2012) (“In light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, which held that §10 of the FAA 
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur, it appears that manifest disregard is 
no longer a viable basis for vacating an award. Accordingly, the Court will not 
address this argument.”). Other lower courts waffle like the circuits, treating 
claims of manifest disregard with skepticism but refusing to abrogate the 
doctrine. See, e.g., FBR Capital Mkts. & Co. v. Hans, Civil No. 13-00535 (RCL), 
2013 WL 5665015 at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2013) (“Because the case law controlling 
the Court’s reasoning has refused to revive ‘manifest disregard’ since its 
apparent death knell in Hall Street, this Court evaluates FBR’s contention with 
considerable suspicion.”). 
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And what of Stolt-Nielsen’s reference to manifest 
disregard?204 Did the Court attempt to resurrect the doctrine from 
the shallow grave of Hall Street? Or was the reference merely a 
nod to the Second Circuit’s reliance on manifest disregard in its 
own Stolt-Nielsen decision?205 Perhaps the Court sought to apply 
some altered or veiled form of manifest disregard when it vacated 
the arbitrator’s decision.206 Or perhaps the more likely answer is 
that the Court applied a different standard of review 
altogether.207   
So should one care? Is the confusion surrounding manifest 
disregard really worth an expenditure of time and effort to 
correct? Consider this: In 2012 alone, over three years after Hall 
Street supposedly “closed the door” on manifest disregard,208 the 
doctrine appeared in 142 federal cases.209 Not surprisingly, the 
majority of these cases were in circuits that have expressly held 
that manifest disregard is still a viable doctrine.210 Forty-one of 
the cases, however, arose in circuits that had yet to determine if 
the doctrine survived Hall Street.211 And six of the cases arose in 
circuits that have expressly disallowed claims of manifest 
disregard.212 The bottom line is that legal and judicial resources 
are clearly being spent arguing and analyzing a doctrine without 
concrete principles or clear acceptance. 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 
n.3 (2010). 
 205. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96–101 
(analyzing Stolt-Nielsen’s claim that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded 
governing law). 
 206. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (“[A]ssuming, arguendo, that 
[manifest disregard] applies, we find it satisfied . . . .”). 
 207. This Note argues that it did. Infra Part IV.C. 
 208. Sheridan, supra note 151, at 105. 
 209. The author conducted a search on Westlaw Next in February of 2013 
for all federal cases in which “manifest disregard” appeared by typing: “adv: 
‘manifest disregard’” into the search bar and counting all cases decided in 2012. 
 210. These cases occurred in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits in 2012. 
 211. These cases were found by running a search in Westlaw Next for “adv: 
‘manifest disregard’” in the First, Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits and counting 
the cases decided in 2012. 
 212. These cases were found by running a search in Westlaw Next for “adv: 
‘manifest disregard’” in the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and counting 
the cases decided in 2012. 
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This Note proposes a new framework for federal courts213 to 
apply when analyzing challenges to awards or decisions of an 
arbitrator, when the challenge is based on a claim that the 
arbitrator incorrectly applied a legal principle or applied an 
incorrect legal principle. This framework is created in an attempt 
to harmonize Supreme Court precedent dealing with review of 
arbitral decisions and to strike a balance between those who 
favor expanded judicial review of arbitral awards214 and those 
who argue for extremely limited judicial oversight.215 Regardless 
of the chosen framework, though, there should be a final 
pronouncement on exactly what manifest disregard means and 
whether it is a viable ground for vacatur. As the Supreme Court 
itself has stated, “in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”216 
IV. A New Framework for Analyzing Challenges to Awards Based 
on Alleged Arbitrator Error 
The critics of manifest disregard rail against the notion that 
courts can engage in substantive review of arbitrators’ 
decisions.217 They point to the “procedural” nature of the FAA 
itself.218 Section 10, which provides the exclusive grounds for 
                                                                                                     
 213. See supra note 67 (explaining the difference between arbitral award 
challenges in state and federal court, and how those difference affect the 
application of manifest disregard). 
 214. See supra note 24 (listing publications in favor of expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards). 
 215. See supra note 25 (listing publications opposed to expanded judicial 
review of arbitration awards). 
 216. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 217. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 45 (“When parties 
choose arbitration, the role that the judiciary should seek is no role at all.”); 
Davis, supra note 24, at 130 (“[T]he scope of substantive review for arbitration 
awards has bred uncertainty among the courts and dismay among litigants 
unable to predict what level of review the courts will apply or how they will 
apply it.”).  
 218. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 1, 2 (2009) (“[T]he FAA’s vacatur standards bar courts from second-
guessing the substantive correctness of arbitral awards, permitting review only 
for procedural irregularities that evince extreme or outrageous conduct, such as 
corruption or fraud by one of the parties or the arbitrators.” (citations omitted)); 
Davis, supra note 24, at 115 (stating the grounds for vacatur in the FAA “limit 
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vacatur in federal court,219 does indeed seem to focus its review 
on problems with the structure and propriety of the arbitration 
proceeding itself, and sanctions vacatur for things like corruption, 
fraud, or arbitrator misconduct.220 Many took this focus on the 
impartiality and fairness of the proceedings to exclude vacatur 
based on the substantive inequities of decisions.221 
The Supreme Court’s recent Stolt-Nielsen decision guts that 
proposition. The Court never accused the arbitrators of being 
corrupt or biased, and no allegations of fraud were made. 
Nonetheless, the Court vacated the arbitration panel’s award 
under § 10 of the FAA222 because it had “imposed its own policy 
choice and thus exceeded its powers.”223 The Stolt-Nielsen 
holding, coupled with the rationale of the federal circuits that 
decided manifest disregard survives Hall Street as a facet of 
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA,224 provide firm support for the availability 
of substantive review for arbitral awards.  
The form that this review should take is an open question, 
though.225 In Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Ginsburg criticized the 
majority for basing its ruling, in part, on a distinction between 
law and policy that she found absent from the facts of the case.226 
                                                                                                     
the scope of review to issues of gross procedural unfairness”). 
 219. Supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 220. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 221. See Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 147 (1997) (arguing that 
review under the FAA should be limited to “the bare essentials needed to afford 
due process and to protect the state’s own interests”). 
 222. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (allowing vacatur where “the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter was not made”). 
 223. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 
(2010). 
 224. See Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e conclude that, after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard 
of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur because it is a part of § 10(a)(4). 
We note that we join the Second Circuit in this interpretation of Hall Street 
Associates.”). 
 225. The current dissonance among the federal circuits provides ample 
support that substantive review of arbitral awards is in a very unclear state. See 
supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text (outlining the disagreement over 
manifest disregard). 
 226. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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Substantive review should also not run afoul of the axiom that 
review is unavailable for arbitrator’s mere errors in legal 
interpretation.227  
This Note proposes a framework that attempts to walk the 
line between exhaustive substantive review of arbitrators’ 
application of legal principles and review limited to the 
procedural propriety of the arbitration proceeding itself. The goal 
is to reconcile concerns about preserving the finality and 
expediency of the arbitration process228 with concerns about 
potential arbitrator overreaching demonstrated in Stolt-
Nielsen.229 It is a series of questions and analyses designed to 
determine whether or not the arbitrator applied a legal or 
decisional principle from an appropriate body of law, or whether 
an extreme form of manifest disregard occurred. If the arbitrator 
did apply law from an appropriate source, then any error in her 
application would not be a ground for vacatur. If, however, the 
arbitrator failed to consult the appropriate set of rules,230 or 
exhibited a documented manifest disregard of the controlling 
law,231 she would have exceeded her powers under § 10(a)(4) of 
the FAA.232  
At the outset, it must be made clear to which sort of petitions 
for vacatur this framework applies, and to which it does not. This 
framework is designed for situations in which a party to the 
arbitration proceedings seeks judicial review of the award for 
arbitrator error. The claim would involve either intentional 
conduct or an honest mistake on the part of the arbitrator. The 
framework requires only that the petitioner seek vacatur because 
the arbitrator allegedly did not correctly resolve the dispute.233 
                                                                                                     
 227. Supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1245 (Wash. 1995) (“Parties enter 
into arbitration agreements for numerous reasons. Among them are to reduce 
expenses of litigation and to ensure a speedy and final resolution of their 
disputes. The expectation of finality is at the very heart of any arbitration 
agreement.”). 
 229. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (describing how the 
arbitration panel exceeded its authority). 
 230. Infra Part IV.C. 
 231. Infra Part IV.E. 
 232. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012) (permitting vacatur when a court finds that 
the arbitrator exceeded her powers when crafting the award). 
 233. However, the petition needs to have a reasonable basis for believing 
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Allegations of fraud, partiality, misconduct, or procedural 
irregularities would not be evaluated under this framework 
because those claims fall under § 10(a)(1)–(3).234  
A. Is There a Record of the Proceeding and a Reasoned Opinion? If 
not, were a Reasoned Opinion and a Record Required? 
As a general rule, arbitrators are under no obligation to 
provide a reasoned opinion along with the award.235 The 
arbitrator does not need to explain himself; he just needs to 
communicate his final decision to the parties. There is also no 
general requirement that a record of the proceedings be kept.236 
In fact, arbitration organizations discourage written opinions to 
help support the finality of arbitration and discourage review.237 
If there is no reasoned opinion or record to evaluate, there is little 
upon which a reviewing court can base a decision to vacate.238 
                                                                                                     
that the arbitrator has erred in a manner warranting vacatur. Otherwise, 
sanctions may be appropriate. See infra Part IV.F. 
 234. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3). 
 235. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (“[Arbitrators’ awards] 
may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete 
record of their proceedings . . . .”); Halligan v Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 
204 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We want to make it clear that we are not holding that 
arbitrators should write opinions in every case or even in most cases.”). 
Reasoned opinions contain a determination of governing law and an application 
of that law to the parties’ evidence and arguments. Awards without such 
opinions merely state the actual award, perhaps accompanied by a brief 
statement of facts and the relief requested by the respective parties. Compare 
Jamney Montgomery Scott LLC v. Bergdoll, No. 12-0071, 2013 WL 653362 
(FINRA) (Feb. 14, 2013) (Crumley, Arb., La Manna, Arb., Mayer, Arb.) (making 
an award without a reasoned opinion), with Algonquin Shipping Corp. v. Archer 
Daniels Midland Co., SMA No. 4198, 2013 WL 685910 (S.M.A.S.S.) (Feb. 13, 
2013) (Martowski, Arb., Siciliano, Arb., Arnold, Arb.) (issuing a reasoned 
opinion for the arbitral award).  
 236. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (noting that arbitrators need not keep a 
record of the arbitration proceeding); Downey v. Sharp, 51 A.3d 573, 584 (Md. 
2012) (noting that there was no transcript of the arbitration proceedings and 
exhibits submitted during the arbitration were not included in the record). 
 237. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal.4th 362, 395 (Cal. 
1994). 
 238. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (explaining the 
difficulties in reviewing an award for error when the arbitrator has not given a 
reasoned opinion). 
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Some courts have decided to make inferences based on the 
record available to them.239 These excursions into the mind of an 
arbitrator may stem from judicial suspicion of arbitration itself;240 
the sort of suspicion the FAA was created to stop.241 Any 
substantive review of arbitral awards must avoid such a 
sweeping, speculative inquiry into the rationale and justifications 
for an award. Failure to install such a safeguard does violence to 
the foundational principle of the FAA: that arbitral awards be 
respected and enforced by the courts.242 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland243 recently offered a fine 
criticism of such inferences in its Downey v. Sharp244 decision. 
The lower court had vacated an arbitral award because it found 
the award to be “completely irrational.”245 Although the arbitrator 
issued a written opinion, the opinion did not explain an apparent 
inconsistency contained in the award.246 That court, however, did 
                                                                                                     
 239. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(using the lack of a reasoned arbitral opinion as evidence that the arbitrators 
manifestly disregarded the law). 
 240. See id.  
[W]hen the Supreme Court ruled that an employee could be forced to 
assert an ADEA claim in an arbitral forum, the Court did so on the 
assumptions that the claimant would not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute, that the arbitration agreement simply 
changed the forum for enforcement of those rights and that a 
claimant could effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights in the 
arbitration. . . . This case puts those assumptions to the test.  
(citations omitted). 
 241. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987) 
(“The [FAA] was intended to reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements . . . by placing arbitration agreements upon the same footing as 
other contracts.” (internal quotes omitted)). 
 242. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The 
preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private 
agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we 
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . .”). 
 243. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals was applying its codified 
version of the UAA, and not the FAA, the issue remains the same: courts should 
not infer arbitrator error from a scant record just because they disagree with or 
are confused by the award. Downey v. Sharp, 51 A.3d 573, 575, 583–84 (Md. 
2012).  
 244. 51 A.3d 573 (Md. 2012). 
 245. Id. at 582. 
 246. Id. at 577–78 (explaining the irrationality claim). The arbitrator 
amended the award to include a phrase implying that the petitioner’s 
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not have access to any form of transcript from the proceedings; 
none was created.247 The Court of Appeals criticized the lower 
court’s determination of irrationality, stating, “without any 
knowledge of what was said or submitted at the arbitration 
hearing, [the lower court’s determination] might itself be deemed 
‘irrational.’”248 The lower court had not only “refused to defer to 
the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,” but had 
“rendered its own findings of fact and conclusions, which were 
contrary to those of the arbitrator.”249 The lower court had 
overstepped its bounds. 
It should be beyond a court’s authority to vacate awards 
based on mere assumptions; if the parties want substantive 
judicial review to be available, they need to provide a basis for the 
court’s evaluation.250 This means inserting into arbitration 
agreements a requirement that arbitrators provide reasoned 
opinions for their awards that address both parties’ arguments.251 
If a party wants to challenge an award by claiming that the 
arbitrator applied an inappropriate legal principle, then a 
reviewing court needs to know exactly which legal principle the 
arbitrator applied and why she applied it.252 If an opinion does 
not exist, then the losing party will just have to live with the 
                                                                                                     
predecessor in title had an express easement through the other party’s land. Id. 
at 578. The petitioner argued that this amendment rendered the award 
irrational, because in another portion of the award, the arbitrator stated that 
the predecessor did not have a valid express easement. Id. 
 247. Id. at 575–76. 
 248. Id. at 585. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (“[Because the arbitrators’] 
award may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a 
complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators’ conception of the legal 
meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or 
‘material fact,’ . . . cannot be examined.”). 
 251. In order to facilitate review, the reasoned opinion needs to reflect the 
arbitrator’s conclusions regarding both parties’ cases. Otherwise, the arbitrator 
could make an improper award and simply not address what should have been 
the winning argument. See Halligan v. Piper Jafray, 148 F.3d 197, 199–200 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (describing how the correct legal principles were explained to the 
arbitrators, who then issued an opinion that did not contain any mention of 
them). 
 252. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (positing that 
substantive review is not possible if a reviewing court does not know how the 
arbitrator crafted the award). 
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award and perhaps insist on reasoned opinions in the future. If a 
reasoned opinion and record were required and yet not generated, 
then the arbitrator has exceeded her authority under § 10(a)(4).253 
B. Which Bodies of Law or Rules Govern the Arbitration? 
The arbitrator must resolve a dispute by applying a rule or 
principle from a governing body of law.254 This is because through 
their submission to arbitration, the parties decide which rules 
will be used to settle the disagreement.255 If an arbitrator refuses 
to apply a principle from a governing body of law, then the 
arbitrator has exceeded her authority under the submission.256  
The arbitrator can determine which bodies of law govern the 
dispute by looking both to the parties’ contract and to some 
default rules.257 The default rules are derived from case 
precedent, particularly the Supreme Court’s.258 The key to this 
analysis, though, is the parties’ intent.259 Because arbitration is a 
contractual form of dispute resolution, the parties have almost260 
                                                                                                     
 253. This is because an arbitrator’s failure to follow explicit instructions in 
the agreement is a clear violation of § 10(a)(4). See W. Canada S.S. Co. v. Cia. 
De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp. 452, 453–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (vacating an 
arbitral award because the proceedings were not conducted as specified in the 
agreement). 
 254. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 
(2010) (“Because the parties agreed their agreement was ‘silent’ in the sense 
that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration, the 
arbitrators’ proper task was to identify the rule of law that governs in that 
situation.”). 
 255. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining that parties to 
arbitration may agree on the rules governing the arbitration). 
 256. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770 (stating that the arbitration panel 
exceeded its power by “imposing its own policy choice”). 
 257. Infra Part IV.C–D. 
 258. Infra Part IV.C–D. 
 259. The wrinkle here is that the arbitrator has the authority to determine 
the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that arbitrators 
are responsible for interpreting the arbitration agreement). This is why the 
framework incorporates default rules; the arbitrator and any reviewing court 
will assume that the parties implicitly incorporated the default rules into the 
contract unless otherwise specified, limiting the arbitrator’s discretion when 
determining the governing law. 
 260. There are a few things parties cannot do through contract. They cannot 
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complete control over which issues are arbitrated,261 how the 
proceedings are conducted, and which rules are applied.262 The 
last pointwhich rules govern the arbitrationis determined 
either through the parties’ express direction in the contract itself 
or inferences regarding the party’s intent made by resorting to 
default standards.263 
Broadly speaking, an arbitration proceeding is governed by 
two separate kinds of law: substantive law and arbitration law.264 
Arbitration law consists of federal arbitration law,265 applicable 
state arbitration law,266 and any private arbitration rules chosen 
by the parties in their agreement.267 Substantive law consists of 
all the rules that may be applied to settle the arbitrable disputes 
themselves.268 The distinction is important because the arbitrator 
will have to interpret provisions in the agreement to refer either 
to substantive law, arbitration law, or both.269 
                                                                                                     
contract for unconscionable or fraudulent proceedings. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) 
(allowing arbitration agreements to be voided by generally applicable contract 
defenses). They cannot submit issues to arbitration that have been held 
inarbitrable (although there are very few disputes that cannot be arbitrated). 
See RICHARD A. LORD, 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:28 (4th ed., 2012) 
(stating that criminal matters cannot be arbitrated). They also cannot alter the 
scope of judicial review under the FAA. See supra notes 129–35 (discussing Hall 
Street’s foreclosure of expanded judicial review). 
 261. See First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (“[T]he 
arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate that dispute . . . .”). 
 262. Supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 263. Infra Part IV.D.2–4. 
 264. See Gaitis, Clearing the Air, supra note 22, at 33–34 (discussing the 
difference between arbitration law and substantive law). 
 265. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012). 
 266. This includes both a state’s codification of its arbitration rules, see, e.g., 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201–3-234 (2012), as well as any other 
state law that impacts arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995) (describing the New York case 
law forbidding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages). 
 267. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 61 (analyzing the private arbitration 
rules that the parties incorporated into their arbitration agreement, the 
National Association of Securities Dealers rules). 
 268. See id. at 59–60 (distinguishing between substantive rights and 
obligations and allocation of power to arbitral tribunals). 
 269. See id. at 59–60 (positing interpretations of the arbitration agreement 
that would incorporate either New York’s substantive and arbitration law, or 
merely New York’s substantive law). 
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The arbitrator must determine which bodies of substantive 
law and which bodies of arbitration law govern the dispute. 
Federal substantive law occupies distinct areas of the legal 
sphere, and is generally based on statutes.270 Because statutory 
rights usually271 can be arbitrated, the arbitrator must determine 
if any federal statutes or federal common law govern a dispute. 
State substantive law will generally be implicated as well, both 
common law and statutory law.272 Only states possessing a 
material connection to the dispute are potential sources of 
governing rules.273 Federal arbitration law is grounded in the 
FAA and is presumed to govern any domestic arbitration dealing 
with maritime transactions or interstate commerce.274 This is 
because §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA preempt conflicting state law and 
§ 2 contains a broad federal pro-arbitration policy.275 States have 
their own arbitration law as well, which consists of both state 
arbitration statutes similar to the FAA, as well as arbitration-
related jurisprudence and statutes that affect arbitration 
agreements and proceedings.276 Lastly, the parties may choose to 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Thomas E. Baker, The Eleventh Circuit’s First Decade Contribution 
to the Law of the Nation, 1981-1991, 19 NOVA L. REV. 323, 368 (1994) (“Federal 
law is based on statute.”). 
 271. Not all statutory rights are arbitrable; Congress has the authority to 
specify certain statutory claims that cannot be resolved in arbitration and must 
be brought in court. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 272. THOMAS A. OEHMKE, 1 COMM. ARB. § 11:2 (2012). 
 273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 cmt. b, c (1971) 
(illustrating the reason for conflict-of-law analysis). Also note that while choice 
of law provisions make conflict of law analyses easier, state laws are of course 
presumed to apply to an arbitration agreement not containing such a provision. 
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (“[I]f 
a . . . contract . . . had been signed in New York and was to be performed in New 
York, presumably ‘the laws of the State of New York’ would apply [to the 
arbitration], even though the contract did not expressly so state.”). 
 274. See Sovak v. Chungai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that there is a “presumption that the FAA supplies the rules for 
arbitration”). 
 275. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983) (stating that § 2 of the FAA reflects a “liberal federal policy” in favor of 
arbitration). 
 276. Supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
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incorporate private arbitration rules, such as the American 
Arbitration Association’s.277 
Just as the parties may incorporate private arbitration rules 
into the agreement, they may also incorporate specific state law 
as well. This is done through a choice of law provision in either 
the contract or arbitration agreement itself.278 These provisions 
dictate which state’s body of law will be applied to disputes 
arising under the agreement.279 The parties may also modify their 
chosen governing bodies of law by either including or omitting 
specific rules.280 Because arbitration is a matter of consent, the 
parties are only constrained in their choice of governing rules by 
generally applicable contract defenses281 or the inviolability of 
statutory rights.282 Notwithstanding those restrictions, the 
parties may generally agree to be bound by whatever rules they 
see fit. 
Arbitrators are bound to enforce choice of law provisions and 
apply the law of the chosen state. This may include both the 
state’s substantive law and its arbitration law.283 Because the 
                                                                                                     
 277. See Rules & Procedures, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, www.adr.org/aaa/ 
faces/rules (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (describing the American Arbitration 
Association’s rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 278. See Ross Ball, FAA Preemption by Choice-of-Law Provisions: 
Enforceable or Unenforceable?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 613, 613 (explaining choice 
of law provisions and their relationship to arbitration). Choice of law provisions 
are common in arbitration agreements because they remove most of the 
uncertainty surrounding which state’s law will be applied to a dispute. See 
Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top Ten Developments in 
Arbitration in the 1990s, 55-JAN. DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 30 (2001) (“Choice of law 
provisions are common in arbitration contracts . . . .”); John A. Taylor, 
Commercial and Contract Law, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 85, 99 (2008) (noting the 
“ever-increasing popularity of forum-selection and choice of law provisions in 
contracts”). 
 279. See Volt Info Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989) (stating that a choice of law provision in the parties’ 
contract designating California law as governing means that a dispute arising 
under the contract will be decided under California law). 
 280. See W. Can. S.S. Co. v. Cia. De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp. 452, 
453 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (describing the arbitration agreement, which contained a 
requirement that three arbitrators decide the dispute). 
 281. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 282. See infra Part IV.D.1 (explaining why statutory rights cannot be 
defeated through arbitration agreements). 
 283. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478–79 (applying both state substantive law and 
state arbitration law to the dispute because the Court found that the parties’ 
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parties have expressly agreed to be bound to that particular 
state’s law, the laws of other states that may have otherwise been 
implicated are displaced.284 Between federal substantive and 
arbitration law, state substantive and arbitration law,285 and any 
private arbitration rules or substantive rules the parties have 
expressly included in the agreement, the arbitrator often has 
numerous sources of governing law from which to choose.286 
C. Did the Arbitrator Apply a Principle or Rule from a Governing 
Body of Law? 
Under this framework, an arbitral award would be vacated if 
a petitioning party was able to show that the arbitrator did not 
apply a rule or principle from a governing body of law. This rule 
is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen. In 
that case, the Court vacated an arbitrator’s decision under 
§ 10(a)(4) of the FAA, declaring that the arbitrators had exceeded 
their authority.287 But the Court did not find an excess of 
authority under its more traditional formulations,288 nor did the 
                                                                                                     
agreement required applying both). 
 284. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 812 F. Supp. 845, 846–
48 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (applying New York law even though the petition was filed in 
Illinois). Statutory rights, however, cannot be displaced, because these rights 
cannot be waived through arbitration. See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 
667 F.3d 204, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that statutory claims may only be 
arbitrated if the arbitration proceeding can effectively vindicate the statutory 
right). 
 285. Which may or may not be expressly incorporated through a choice of 
law provision. 
 286. Trade customs and international law may also be implicated. THOMAS 
A. OEHMKE, 1 COMM. ARB. § 11:2 (2012). 
 287. Supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 288. Courts have commonly found violations of § 10(a)(4) when arbitrators 
decide a dispute that the parties did not agree to submit to arbitration, see 
Madison Hotel v. Hotel & Rest. Employees, Local 25, AFL-CIO, 128 F.3d 743, 
749 (D.D.C. 1997) (finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering 
the reestablishment of an employment position when only individual employee 
disputes were submitted to arbitration), or when the arbitrator did not follow 
specific instructions in the arbitration agreement. See In re Salomon Inc. 
S’holders’ Derivative Litig. 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(refusing to send a matter to arbitration because the agreement specifically 
required arbitration to be conducted by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the NYSE refused to participate).  
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Court’s analysis support a finding of manifest disregard.289 Under 
the Stolt-Nielsen decision, arbitrators must consult governing law 
and find a principle applicable to the dispute.290 If the arbitrator 
fails to do so, she exceeds her authority by acting “as if [she] had 
a common-law court’s authority to develop what [she] viewed as 
the best rule.”291  
The federal policy favoring the finality and expediency of 
arbitration dictates that arbitral awards cannot be reviewed for 
arbitrator error in applying the law.292 It is not within the 
arbitrator’s power, though, to decide sua sponte which body of 
law governs the dispute itself, or to make up her own rule.293 This 
power rests solely in the hands of the parties who have agreed to 
be bound by the arbitrator’s decision. Just as the parties decide 
which disputes will be submitted to arbitration, they also decide 
which rules will be applied to resolve those disputes.294 Failing to 
apply a principle from governing law thus constitutes an 
impermissible exceeding of arbitrator authority.295 
To determine if an award should be vacated for failing to be 
grounded in governing law, an adequate record of the arbitration 
proceeding is required.296 This is the only way to determine that 
the petitioning party actually argued in favor of applying a 
principle from a governing body of law. Challenging an arbitral 
award is akin to seeking appellate review of a judgment. The 
reviewing court does not necessarily decide the appropriate 
                                                                                                     
 289. Supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 290. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 
1768–69 (2010) (stating that arbitration panel should have consulted governing 
bodies of law to see if a “default rule” existed in any of them, which would have 
resolved the issue). 
 291. Id. at 1769. 
 292. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that “mere allegations of error are insufficient” to warrant award 
vacatur). 
 293. Supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that parties control 
which rules will govern the arbitration proceeding). 
 295. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining the holding 
of Stolt-Nielsen). 
 296. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 43 (explaining the 
difficulties in reviewing an award for error when the arbitrator has not given a 
reasoned opinion). 
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resolution of the dispute, but rather determines if the arbitration 
proceedings were conducted correctly.297  
A basic tenet of appellate review is the necessity of 
presentation: in order for an issue to be addressed on appeal, it 
must have been presented to the lower tribunal.298 This rule is 
necessary to ensure that adjudicators have all of the relevant 
information presented to them and to protect parties from being 
blindsided by unknown issues on appeal.299 These same principles 
should apply with even more fervor to arbitral award challenges, 
because arbitration strives to attain a level of speed and finality 
often absent from litigation.300 If an arbitrator is not at least 
made aware of the potential applicability of a body of law, then a 
party should be prevented from later challenging the award 
because that specific law was never applied. 
This Stolt-Nielsen-based standard is not particularly high, 
and it is intentionally so. A more searching review would 
necessarily implicate an arbitrator’s interpretations of the law, 
which are not subject to challenge.301 The parties have waived 
their right to that level of review.302 In order to successfully 
vacate an award under this standard, a petitioning party 
normally must demonstrate that the arbitrator did not resort to 
any body of governing law.303 But there is one exception. 
                                                                                                     
 297. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2012) (“If an award is vacated and the time within 
which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court 
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (vacating 
the arbitration panel’s decision and remanding the dispute back to arbitration), 
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
 298. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941) (“Ordinarily an 
appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below.”). 
 299. Id. 
 300. See supra notes 55, 60, 61 and accompanying text (outlining the goals 
and attractive features of arbitration). 
 301. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 
2008) (stating that an arbitrator’s “mere error in interpretation or application of 
the law is insufficient” to justify vacating the award). 
 302. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 39 (“[W]hat 
happens when an arbitrator demonstrably has blown it? Have parties 
consenting to this forum irrevocably bargained for such a result, without 
recourse? This writer believes they have . . . .”). 
 303. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 
(2010) (“[I]nstead of identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the 
FAA or either maritime or New York law, the arbitration panel imposed its own 
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Sometimes, the arbitrator does not have a completely unfettered 
choice between bodies of law: If controlling bodies of law conflict 
over the appropriate solution to a dispute, the arbitrator must 
perform a conflict-of-laws analysis. 
D. Did Governing Bodies of Law Conflict on the Issue Decided by 
the Arbitrator? If So, Did the Arbitrator Perform a Conflict of 
Laws Analysis? 
Suppose now that the arbitrator has encountered a problem: 
different governing bodies of law offer conflicting dispositions to 
the issue at hand. The parties disagree about which body of law 
should control, and they have presented evidence in favor of their 
respective positions. Because the arbitrator is bound to apply one 
of the governing bodies of law, he must perform a choice of law 
analysis.304 
A choice of law analysis is a method employed by an 
adjudicator to determine which body of law should control a given 
dispute. Choice of law is itself a body of law, and each state has 
its own choice of law principles that its courts use to resolve 
conflicts of law.305 In this Note, the term “choice of law” is used 
broadly to include not only conflicts between different states’ laws 
but also conflicts between state law and private arbitration law 
as well as conflicts between state law and federal law. Because a 
choice of law analysis is itself an interpretation of choice of law 
principles, an arbitrator’s decision to apply one body of governing 
law over another should generally not be reviewable.306  
Federal precedent has identified a few key exceptions to this 
rule, though, and arbitrators should be keenly aware of them. 
Under this Note’s framework, failure to abide by these 
established exceptions would be grounds for vacatur.  
                                                                                                     
policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.” (emphasis added)). 
 304. Supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 305. Supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 306. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (stating that arbitrators, not courts, should decide “what kind of 
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to” because that question depends on 
contract interpretation and arbitration procedures). 
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Allowing vacatur under those circumstances is premised on 
two claims: First, arbitration cannot frustrate statutory rights, 
including rights contained in the FAA.307 This rule can trump 
even the express provisions in the arbitration agreement.308 
Second, whenever the parties’ intent can be found in their 
agreement, it must be applied. Not doing so would frustrate the 
contractual nature of arbitration.309 When a choice of law analysis 
is clearly settled, then the parties incorporate that resolution into 
their agreement and the arbitrator is bound to uphold it. 
1. First Exception: Frustration of Statutory Rights 
The first exception is the most important and trumps any 
other considerations. This is because it is based on an absolute 
rule: agreements to arbitrate cannot act as waivers of statutory 
rights.310 This means that whenever a party arbitrates a dispute 
involving a statutory right, the arbitrator is bound to enforce that 
right and apply the law governing it. This absolute rule stems 
from the prior prohibition on the arbitration of statutory rights.311 
For most of its history in this country, arbitration was seen as an 
unsuitable forum for such claims.312 Now that the federal policy 
                                                                                                     
 307. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”). 
 308. See infra Part IV.D.1 (explaining the importance of protecting statutory 
rights in arbitration). 
 309. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) 
(“[W]e have repeatedly referred to the Act’s basic objective as assuring that 
courts treat arbitration agreements like all other contracts.” (internal quotes 
omitted)). 
 310. Supra note 307. 
 311. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the 
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by 
holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the 
[Securities] Act.”), overruled by Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 312. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626–27  
Some time ago this Court expressed hope for the [FAA’s] usefulness 
both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise 
created . . . and we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of 
the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral 
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in favor of arbitration has been clearly established to encompass 
statutory rights, courts must ensure that arbitrators enforce 
these rights.313  
This rule is so important that it can trump the express terms 
of the parties’ agreement. The Second Circuit demonstrated this 
point clearly with its In re American Express Merchants’ 
Litigation314 decision. In that case, the court was asked to 
consider whether a provision in an arbitration clause that clearly 
prohibited class arbitration was valid in light of the plaintiffs’ 
statutory right to assert claims under the Sherman Act.315 
American Express argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stolt-Nielsen rendered class action arbitration waivers 
enforceable per se.316 The Second Circuit disagreed and instead 
looked to whether the class action waiver would “deprive the 
plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”317 
Relying on economic evidence, the court concluded that, as a 
matter of law, forcing the plaintiffs to bring their Sherman Act 
claims individually rather than as a class effectively precluded 
them from bringing their claims at all.318 This was because each 
plaintiff’s individual claim was far too small to justify the cost of 
an arbitration proceeding.319 The court emphasized that while 
arbitration can be an “effective vehicle for vindicating statutory 
rights,” arbitration is only appropriate if it allows the claimant to 
effectively vindicate those rights.320 
2. Second Exception: Federal PreemptionState Laws Singling 
Out Arbitration 
                                                                                                     
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative 
means of dispute resolution.  
(internal quotes omitted). 
 313. See id. at 628 (recognizing that parties’ statutory rights must be 
protected in arbitration). 
 314. 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 315. Id. at 212. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. at 241. 
 320. Id. 
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The next two choice of law principles (which are subordinate 
to the first)321 involve federal preemption of state arbitration law. 
Federal law, including federal arbitration law, is the supreme law 
of the land and preempts conflicting state law.322 Preemption 
occurs when either Congress specifically mandates that a piece of 
legislation preempts state law,323 or when preemption is 
implied.324 A state law is implicitly preempted when it is either 
impossible to comply with both state and federal law,325 or when 
the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”326  
The FAA has no express preemption language,327 but the 
Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating328 that §§ 1 
and 2 of the FAA329 preempt conflicting state law.330 Section 1 
defines the scope of the Act,331 while § 2 contains the chief 
directive of the FAA, mandating recognition and enforcement of 
                                                                                                     
 321. This is because although federal preemption principles can be defeated 
by the parties’ express agreement, infra Part IV.D.4, statutory rights cannot be 
waived by express agreement. Supra Part IV.D.1. 
 322. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, cl. 2 (stating that federal law is supreme). 
 323. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (“Pre-emption 
fundamentally is a question of Congressional intent . . . and when Congress has 
made its intent clear through explicit statutory language, the court’s task is an 
easy one.”). 
 324. See Drahozal, supra note 42, at 397 (discussing implied preemption and 
its two main forms).  
 325. See id. (finding state law preempted because they were so inconsistent 
that it would have been impossible to comply with both (citing Barnett Bank of 
Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963))). 
 326. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 327. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012). 
 328. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 329. Section 2 makes agreements to arbitrate “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 1 provides the definitions applicable to § 2. Id. 
§ 1. 
 330. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (stating that § 2 of the FAA is a 
“substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts,” and that through 
it, Congress “intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 n.6 (1989) (“[W]e have held 
that the FAA’s ‘substantive’ provisions—§§ 1 and 2—are applicable in state as 
well as federal court . . . .”). 
 331. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
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arbitral awards.332 The “federal policy in favor of arbitration” and 
the federal substantive case law are derived from § 2.333 State law 
holds one powerful trump card over the FAA, though. Because 
arbitration is a creature of contract, common contract defenses, 
such as fraud and unconscionability, are not preempted and can 
invalidate arbitration agreements.334  
Cases following Southland established that the FAA 
preempts any state law singling out arbitration agreements for 
categorical special regulation.335 That preemption principle is 
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.336 In Concepcion, the Court held that 
a California law invalidating all arbitration agreements 
containing collective-arbitration waivers was preempted.337 The 
California law declared all such waivers unconscionable, and the 
Concepcions argued that the law fit within the saving clause in 
§ 2 encompassing unconscionable contracts.338 The Supreme 
                                                                                                     
 332. See id. § 2; Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that § 2 of the FAA is the “primary substantive 
provision of the Act”). 
 333. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 
(2006) (stating that the FAA “created a body of federal substantive law,” and the 
principle that an arbitration provision is severable from the main contract is 
part of that federal substantive law); Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24 
(describing § 2 as reflecting a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”). 
 334. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“A written provision . . . to settle by arbitration 
a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon grounds 
as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”); Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to 
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA].”). 
 335. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may not, however, invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration 
provisions.”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A state-law 
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to 
arbitrate is at issue does not comport with the text of 9 U.S.C. § 2.”); Drahozal, 
supra note 42, at 408–10 (explaining the relationship between how closely a 
state law singles out arbitration and its likelihood of being found preempted by 
the FAA); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: An 
Overview, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 29 (2001) (“[A] state may not treat an 
arbitration contract differently, and particularly less favorably, than other 
contracts.” (citations omitted)). 
 336. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 337. Id. at 1753. 
 338. Id. at 1746–47; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing that agreements 
to arbitrate shall be enforceable except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
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Court disagreed, and while acknowledging that unconscionability 
is a viable ground for a state court to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement, the Court also stated that nothing in § 2 should be 
construed to “preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”339 Because this law 
singled out arbitration agreements and attempted to impose class 
arbitration on unwilling parties, it conflicted with a basic goal of 
the FAA and was thus preempted.340 The state law was not aimed 
at invalidating specific arbitration agreements as unconscionable 
under their individual circumstances, but at categorically 
invalidating all class-arbitration waivers.  
3. Third Exception: Federal PreemptionState Laws Invalidating 
Agreements to Arbitrate 
State law is also preempted if, although not singling out 
arbitration agreements for special regulation, the law still has 
the effect of invalidating the agreement to arbitrate. The 
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this type of arbitration 
invalidation occurred in 2008 with its Preston v. Ferrer341 
decision. The case revolved around a dispute between a television 
personality and his talent agent.342 Ferrer and Preston had 
signed a “personal management” contract, but Ferrer failed to 
pay Preston his management fees.343 Preston sought to arbitrate 
the dispute, but Ferrer lodged a petition with the California 
Labor Commission.344 Ferrer claimed that Preston was actually 
operating as a talent agent, and thus was required to possess a 
license for such activities under California’s Talent Agencies Act 
(TAA).345 He had no license.346 Their contract contained a choice 
                                                                                                     
equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
 339. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 340. Id. at 1748–49. 
 341. 552 U.S. 346 (2008). 
 342. Id. at 350. The personality was Judge Alex Ferrer, the star of a 
courtroom television show on Fox. Id. 
 343. Id. at 350–52. 
 344. Id. at 350. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
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of law provision designating California law as governing, as well 
as a provision declaring that any conflict between the agreement 
and present or future law should be resolved in favor of applying 
legal rules over contractual rules.347 
The crux of the case was whether the FAA preempted the 
portion of California’s TAA vesting initial adjudicative authority 
over talent agency disputes in the California Labor 
Commission.348 The TAA required that the Commission would 
decide all disputes arising under the Act.349 It did not single out 
arbitration agreements for special regulation, but it had the effect 
of invalidating, or at least temporarily suspending, the 
arbitration agreement until the Commission had rendered its 
own decision on the matter.350 So the question before the Court 
was not whether the TAA was preempted entirely,351 but whether 
the Commission or the arbitrator had the authority to decide 
whether Preston was acting as an unlicensed talent agent in 
violation of the TAA.352 
The Supreme Court held the jurisdictional component of the 
TAA preempted.353 Regardless of whether a state law vests 
primary jurisdiction over a dispute in a court or an 
administrative agency, the effect is the same: any arbitration 
agreements covering the dispute are invalidated.354 Ferrer argued 
that the jurisdictional grant merely delayed arbitration—that 
once the Commission exercised its primary jurisdiction, the 
parties were free to compel arbitration.355 The Court rejected his 
argument, stating that allowing the Commission to exercise its 
jurisdiction would frustrate arbitration’s “streamlined 
proceedings and expeditious results.”356 
                                                                                                     
 347. Id. at 361. 
 348. Id. at 349–50. 
 349. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (2012) (“In cases of controversy arising 
under this chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the 
Labor Commissioner . . . .”). 
 350. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356–57 (2008). 
 351. Id. at 352. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 349. 
 354. Id. at 354–55. 
 355. Id. at 356–57. 
 356. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-
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4. The Exception to the Federal Preemption Exceptions: Party 
Agreement 
So if a state law singles out arbitration agreements for 
special regulation not applicable to contracts generally, or if a 
state law has the effect of invalidating an agreement to arbitrate, 
the state law is preempted. The arbitrator cannot apply the state 
law if she determines that it fits in one of those two categories. 
But because (almost)357 all rules governing arbitration 
proceedings must yield to the parties’ intent, the terms of the 
arbitration agreement can overcome federal preemption.  
The parties are free to choose to apply state law over the 
FAA, or even not to apply federal arbitration law at all. The 
Supreme Court firmly established this principle in Volt 
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior University.358 That case involved Stanford University’s 
alleged breach of its construction contract with Volt, which 
contained both a choice of law provision designating California 
law as governing and an arbitration clause.359 Volt sought to 
compel arbitration under the agreement, while Stanford filed suit 
in state court to stay the arbitration proceedings.360 Stanford was 
seeking indemnity from two other contractors, whose contracts 
with Stanford were not subject to arbitration agreements.361 
California law allowed a court to stay compulsory arbitration 
proceedings until related litigation between a party to the 
agreement and a nonparty had been resolved.362 Volt argued that 
the California law was preempted by § 2 of the FAA.363  
                                                                                                     
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)).  
 357. The parties still cannot contract their way into waivers of statutory 
rights, supra Part IV.D.1, or around common law contract defenses, 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2012). 
 358. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 359. Id. at 470–71. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 471. 
 362. Id. 
 363. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (establishing a federal policy in favor of arbitration); 
Volt, 489 U.S. at 474–76; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (giving parties the right to 
petition a federal district with jurisdiction over the dispute to enforce their 
arbitration agreement). 
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The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the university, finding 
that the choice of law provision contained in the construction 
contract bound the parties not only to California substantive law 
but California arbitration law as well.364 The Court focused on the 
consensual nature of arbitration.365 “By permitting the courts to 
rigorously enforce such agreements according to their 
terms . . . we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations 
of the parties, without doing violence to the FAA.”366  
The crux of Volt was the determination that the parties had 
agreed to incorporate California arbitration law into their 
arbitration, and not just California substantive law. The core 
holding, that parties may override federal arbitration law 
through their agreement, is still good law.367 The Supreme Court 
has since called into serious question one of Volt’s key premises, 
though: the Volt Court’s finding that a standard choice of law 
provision merely referencing “the law of the place where the 
Project was/is located”368 incorporated into the agreement both 
California substantive law and arbitration law.369 This 
assumption is probably no longer valid. 
The first case to challenge the validity of such an assumption 
was Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.370 In that 
case, the parties had entered into a contract containing both an 
arbitration clause and a choice of law provision designating New 
                                                                                                     
 364. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 477–79 (1989). 
 365. See id. at 478 (stating that Congress was motivated in enacting the 
FAA “first and foremost” by a “desire to enforce agreements into which parties 
had entered”).  
 366. Id. at 479. 
 367. See id. (holding that because the parties had agreed to apply California 
arbitration law, the California state law at issue was not preempted); Foulger-
Pratt Residential Contracting, LLC v. Madrigal Condos., LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d 
100, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying the arbitration law of the District of 
Columbia, and not the FAA, to review an arbitral award because the parties 
specifically agreed to be governed by the District’s arbitration law). 
 368. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470. 
 369. See id. at 475 (“[W]e do not think the Court of Appeals offended the 
[federal] principle [favoring arbitration] by interpreting the choice-of-law 
provision to mean that the parties intended the California rules of arbitration, 
including the § 1281.2(c) stay provision, to apply to their arbitration 
agreement.”). 
 370. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
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York state law as governing.371 A dispute arose, the parties 
proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrator’s award included 
punitive damages.372 Shearson (the losing party) objected to the 
award. It claimed that because New York law governed the 
dispute, and New York law allowed only courts, and not 
arbitrators, to award punitive damages,373 the arbitrator’s award 
must be vacated.374 
The Supreme Court held the New York ban on punitive 
damage awards was not applicable to the arbitration 
agreement.375 The Court first acknowledged that its previous 
holdings had recognized a federal policy in favor of allowing 
punitive damages in arbitration.376 It then turned to the question 
of whether or not the parties intended to apply New York’s 
arbitration law to their agreement, which would incorporate the 
ban on punitive damages.377 The Court read the choice of law 
provision to incorporate only New York substantive law as 
applied to the contractual relationship itself, and not New York 
arbitration law.378 The Court distinguished its dissimilar 
interpretation in Volt, explaining that the Volt interpretation 
arose from the Court’s deference to a state court’s interpretation 
of a contract under its own laws.379 Mastrobuono, however, 
involved only federal courts’ interpretations of the contract, so the 
Court was not bound to any prior interpretations. The Supreme 
Court opined that in order for the choice of law provision to 
dictate that state arbitration law applied to the agreement, “New 
York law” would have to mean “New York decisional law, 
including the state’s allocation of power between the courts and 
                                                                                                     
 371. Id. at 54. 
 372. Id. 
 373. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (N.Y. 1976) (holding 
that arbitrators lack the authority to award punitive damages). 
 374. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56–57. 
 375. Id. at 64. 
 376. Id. at 58 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 
265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); and Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), for the proposition that federal arbitration law 
allows punitive damages). 
 377. Id. at 56–57. 
 378. Id. at 59–60. 
 379. Id. at 60 n.4. 
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arbitrators, notwithstanding otherwise applicable federal law.”380 
The Court was not willing to interpret the provision so broadly.381  
The Supreme Court continued this interpretive trend in 
Preston. Ferrer, the party seeking application of California 
arbitration law, relied on the Court’s holding in Volt because that 
case upheld the application of a state law delaying arbitration 
proceedings pending the outcome of other litigation.382 The Court 
rejected his argument and distinguished Volt in two ways. First, 
the state law was applied in Volt because third-party proceedings 
were involved, and the arbitration agreement did not provide any 
guidance on how to handle such a situation.383 The Court used 
the state law as “gap filler.”384 Here, in contrast, the agreement 
specifically stated that “any dispute . . . relating to . . . the breach, 
validity, or legality” of the contract should be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA).385 Second, the Court cited 
Mastrobuono for the rule that when the parties designate both 
applicable state law and private rules governing arbitration, the 
choice of state law is presumed to only incorporate the state’s 
substantive law as applied to the dispute itself, and not the 
state’s arbitration law.386 Because the parties had incorporated 
the AAA’s arbitration rules, they are presumed not to have 
incorporated California’s.387 
Two principles can be gleaned from these cases. First, if a 
party includes private arbitration rules in their agreement, and 
the arbitration rules conflict with governing state arbitration law, 
then the private rules control.388 Second, if the parties want state 
arbitration to be applied to the exclusion of federal arbitration 
law, federal precedent seems to require them to clearly state that 
intent in the agreement.389 
                                                                                                     
 380. Id. at 60. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 360–61 (2008). 
 383. Id. at 361. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. (emphasis added). 
 386. Id. at 361–62. 
 387. Id. at 362–63. 
 388. Supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 389. See Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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The current condition of federal arbitration law preemption 
is sadly unpredictable, though, and these two principles are not 
completely reliable at this point. This is because interpreting 
choice of law provisions is up to the court in which the petition for 
confirmation or vacatur is filed,390 and the petitions are often filed 
in state court.391 A state court may determine that a general 
choice of law provision shows that the parties intended to apply 
that state’s arbitration law instead of the FAA.392 When 
confronting a choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement, 
an arbitrator cannot know with certainty whether a reviewing 
court would find the provision to override federal arbitration law. 
The Supreme Court has indicated that a choice of law provision 
that does not expressly refer to a state’s arbitration law should 
not be construed to trump the FAA.393 Because choice of law 
provisions are often fairly standardized in arbitration 
agreements, sound judicial policy dictates that the provisions be 
uniformly interpreted.394 As a matter of federal arbitration law, 
choice of law provisions in arbitration agreements not mentioning 
arbitration law should not evidence the parties’ intent for state 
                                                                                                     
(“[A] general choice-of-law clause within an arbitration provision does not trump 
the presumption that the FAA supplies the rules for arbitration.”); Roadway 
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] generic 
choice-of-law clause, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that 
contracting parties intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards.”); Jung v. 
Am. Assoc. of Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The intent of 
the contracting parties to apply state arbitration rules or law to arbitration 
proceedings [and not to apply the FAA] must be explicitly stated in the contract 
and . . . a general choice of law provision does not evidence such intent.”). 
 390. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 n.4 
(1995) (stating that the Court in Volt adhered to the state court’s interpretation 
of the parties’ contract). The Supreme Court in Mastrobuono was reviewing a 
federal court’s interpretation of a contract containing a nearly identical choice of 
law provision to the one found in Volt. The Court reached the opposite 
conclusion in Mastrobuono as it did in Volt because it did not owe deference to a 
state court’s interpretation of a contract interpreted under its own laws. 
Drahozal, supra note 42, at 413. 
 391. Drahozal, supra note 42, at 413 & n.152. 
 392. Id. at 412. 
 393. Supra note 390.  
 394. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 
1048 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[B]oilerplate must be distinguished from contractual 
provisions which are peculiar to a particular [agreement] and must be given a 
consistent, uniform interpretation.”). 
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arbitration law to override federal. Without this key assumption, 
the federal preemption exceptions described in this Note395 are on 
unstable ground, and thus cannot serve as reliable guidance for 
arbitrators when interpreting agreements, or for courts reviewing 
arbitral awards under Part D of this framework.396 
E. Did the Arbitrator Correctly Identify a Legal Principle as 
Controlling, and Yet Refuse to Apply It? 
This question preserves the manifest disregard doctrine in a 
very narrow form. If the arbitrator, in a reasoned opinion, 
correctly states a governing legal principle but refuses to apply it, 
then she has exceeded her authority under the parties’ 
submission and the award can be vacated under § 10(a)(4).397 If 
vacatur is to be allowed when attacking an award because it was 
                                                                                                     
 395. Supra Part IV.D.2–3. The “frustration of statutory rights” exception, 
explained supra Part IV.D.1, is unaffected by interpretation of choice of law 
provisions, because this exception can defeat even the parties’ express 
agreement. 
 396. The federal preemption exceptions (to the general rule that arbitrators’ 
conflict-of-law decisions are not reviewable) would be nullified because they are 
based on the premise that the law in this area is settled, that the parties knew 
the law was settled when they drafted the arbitration agreement, and that they 
incorporated the settled law into the agreement. Supra note 309 and 
accompanying text. If the meaning of a generic choice of law provision is not 
settled in favor of the Supreme Court’s approach, then the only exception 
remaining would be the “frustration of statutory rights” exception, described 
supra Part VI.D.1. 
 397. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2008) 
[W]e view the “manifest disregard” doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a 
mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather 
than as judicial review of the arbitrators’ decision. We must therefore 
continue to bear the responsibility to vacate arbitration awards in the 
rare instances in which the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal 
principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the 
disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by 
refusing to apply it. . . . At that point the arbitrators have failed to 
interpret the contract at all, . . . for parties do not agree in advance to 
submit to arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the 
law. Put another way, the arbitrators have thereby “exceeded their 
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012)). 
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premised on an incorrect body of law, then logically vacatur must 
also be available when an arbitrator intentionally refuses to 
apply governing law correctly. Vacatur for failing to apply 
governing law is based on the premise that arbitrators are 
constrained by the parties’ submission; they must apply the 
bodies of law specified or implied in the agreement.398 If, however, 
arbitrators could apply the governing bodies of laws in any way 
that they wished, including incorrectly, then why bother 
requiring them to apply those laws at all? 
By adopting this restricted form of manifest disregard, the 
courts can prevent a severe and extremely rare form of arbitrator 
misconduct.399 In all likelihood, this rule is a completely 
preventative measure and may never actually be used to 
facilitate vacatur. When coupled with the first piece of the 
framework, the reasoned-opinion requirement, the rule produces 
a situation highly unlikely to produce actual violations. If a 
reasoned opinion were a prerequisite for any substantive 
review,400 then any arbitrator bound to create such an opinion 
would probably never openly admit to intentionally ignoring the 
governing law or draft an opinion that is clearly inconsistent with 
the requisite legal principles.401 So the manifest disregard rule 
                                                                                                     
 398. Supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 399. See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 91–92 (“The ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine 
allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award only in ‘those exceedingly 
rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators 
is apparent.’”). 
 400. Supra Part IV.A. 
 401. Finding an actual incident where an arbitrator admitted to ignoring 
governing law is extremely difficult. A fairly close example can be found in 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Open MRI of Morris & Essex, L.P., 813 
A.2d 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). In that case, an unlicensed medical 
diagnostic-testing facility performed a procedure on a patient after getting a 
letter from the state warning the facility that it could not perform any testing 
services until it received the license. Id. at 622–23. The license was later 
granted, but the patient’s insurance company refused to pay the claim, because 
under New Jersey law no duty exists to pay for unlicensed medical services. Id. 
at 623–24, 626. The arbitrator recognized this law, but determined that because 
the license was “in flux” at the time the services were performed, and ultimately 
granted, the insurance company had to pay up. Id. at 623–24. The Superior 
Court vacated the award for manifest disregard of the law, stating, “If an 
arbitrator can issue an award to an unlicensed medical practitioner who has 
been warned by the Department of Health that he could not operate until the 
license is issued, the arbitration process is a sham!” Id. at 633. 
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here is prophylactic: it aims to keep arbitrators applying the rules 
chosen by the parties, even if the arbitrator does not agree with 
the result and would prefer applying different standards. 
F. If the Arbitrator Committed No Legal Error Warranting 
Vacatur, Did the Petitioning Party Have a Reasonable Basis for 
Believing Such an Error Existed? 
This final question serves as the floodgate for this 
framework. Many of the staunchest opponents of manifest 
disregard and substantive review of awards claim that the ability 
to seek such review opens arbitration to prolonged, frivolous 
litigation.402 A losing party may use the threat of litigation to 
negotiate a more favorable position and diminish its own losses 
from an adverse award. An extremely disgruntled party could 
simply employ substantive challenges to make confirmation 
difficult and costly for the opposing side. “Finality” needs to have 
some teeth. 
Substantive review of arbitral awards should be reserved 
only for instances of clear manifest disregard403 or awards not 
grounded in governing law.404 If a party challenging an award has 
no good faith basis for believing that such a deficiency in the 
award exists, then that party is abusing both the court system 
and arbitration as a whole. Measures must be put in place to 
strongly discourage such behavior. 
This Note proposes the aggressive use of sanctions as a 
means to stem abusive substantive challenges to arbitral awards. 
The Eleventh Circuit has already proposed this solution. In its 
B.L. Harbert International, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co.405 
decision, the court posited that sanctions should be imposed on 
parties attacking arbitration awards in court without a legitimate 
legal basis for doing so.406 In justifying this position, the court 
explained that 
                                                                                                     
 402. See Besser, The Arbitrator Blew It!, supra note 25, at 45 (claiming that 
the manifest disregard standard is “an open invitation to litigate forever”). 
 403. Supra Part IV.E. 
 404. Supra Part IV.B–D. 
 405. 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 406. Id. at 913–14. 
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[t]he laudatory goals of the FAA will be achieved only to the 
extent that courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to 
litigation, not an additional layer in a protracted contest. If we 
permit parties who lose in arbitration to freely relitigate their 
cases in court, arbitration will do nothing to reduce congestion 
in the judicial system; dispute resolution will be slower instead 
of faster; and reaching a final decision will cost more instead of 
less.407 
Sanctions were not actually imposed in that case, though, 
because the court did not find that the challenge rose to the 
requisite level of frivolousness.408 
Under the proposed framework,  a few clear instances of 
abusive challenges can be readily anticipated. Asserting a 
substantive challenge to an award409 when no reasoned opinion or 
record of the proceedings exists and was not required should be 
per se abusive.410 A challenge based on failure to apply governing 
law also should be conclusively abusive if the arbitrator applied a 
principle from any body of governing law.411 If governing bodies of 
law conflicted, and this conflict was presented to the arbitrator, 
then a challenge to the resulting award would be abusive if the 
arbitrator conducted a conflict-of-laws analysis412 and did not 
violate one of the three exceptions listed in Part IV.D.413  
Aggressively enforcing sanctions for abusive filings would 
compel losing parties to only assert challenges that they believed 
entertained a reasonable likelihood of success. Because the 
framework proposed here allows very limited review, the 
implication is that few challenges would meet that benchmark. 
Disappointed parties with little ground for substantive review 
would be forced to simply cut their losses and pay the award, and 
arbitration would retain its speed and finality. 
                                                                                                     
 407. Id. at 907. 
 408. Id. at 914. 
 409. Either a claim that the arbitrator did not apply a rule from a governing 
body of law, supra Part IV.C–D, or a claim of the restricted manifest disregard 
standard outlined above, supra Part IV.E. 
 410. Supra Part IV.A. 
 411. Supra Part IV.C. 
 412. Supra Part IV.D. 
 413. Supra Part IV.D.1–4. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Manifest disregard has a turbulent history and is currently 
in a state of limbo.414 The Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision 
has cast serious doubt on the doctrine’s viability as an extra-
statutory ground for arbitral award vacatur.415 Many 
commentators, invoking the federal policy in favor of arbitration 
and its stated goals of expediency and finality, have called for the 
complete abrogation of manifest disregard.416 
Many federal circuits refuse to let the doctrine die, though. 
Fueled by the Supreme Court’s strange and unprecedented 
holding in Stolt-Nielsen, which clearly endorsed some form of 
substantive review of arbitrators’ decisions,417 four circuits have 
concluded that the doctrine survives Hall Street as a formulation 
of one of the enumerated grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA. 
This inconsistency in federal vacatur law is unsatisfactory, and 
definitive resolution is required.418  
Manifest disregard has been tested and found wanting.419 
First of all, the doctrine is overbroad and gives a reviewing court 
power to vacate awards without a sound basis for doing so. 
Current formulations of the doctrine allowing a court to infer an 
arbitrator’s knowledge or intent pose an unacceptable risk that 
substantive challenges will be made available to any losing party 
in an arbitration proceeding.420 The solution is to either eliminate 
                                                                                                     
 414. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text (describing the current 
state of manifest disregard among the federal circuits). 
 415. See supra notes 196–203 and accompanying text (describing Hall 
Street’s effect on the manifest disregard doctrine). 
 416. See supra note 151 (listing commentators who believed that Hall Street 
signaled the end of manifest disregard). 
 417. See supra notes 287–91 and accompanying text (explaining the 
substantive arbitral award review granted by the Supreme Court in Stolt-
Nielsen). 
 418. See supra notes 208–12 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 
frequency with which manifest disregard is asserted in federal court challenges 
to arbitral awards, even in courts that have not determined the doctrine’s 
viability). 
 419. See supra notes 240–49 and accompanying text (explaining why 
allowing courts to divine arbitrators’ knowledge and intent without a written 
opinion is undesirable); supra notes 196–212 and accompanying text (describing 
the current confusing state of manifest disregard). 
 420. See supra notes 85–87, 89–90, 103 and accompanying text (listing the 
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the ability of courts to make that inference,421 or to foreclose 
substantive review entirely.422 The Supreme Court has rejected 
the latter contention in its Stolt-Nielsen decision,423 so the logical 
solution is to allow substantive review only when a complete 
record of the arbitration proceeding and a reasoned opinion are 
available.424  
Manifest disregard is also underinclusive. Despite the 
Supreme Court’s musings,425 the type of review granted in Stolt-
Nielsen does not fit within manifest disregard.426 The Stolt-
Nielsen court did not find that the arbitrators identified 
governing legal principles and ignored them.427 Instead, the Court 
vacated the arbitrators’ award because the arbitrators failed to 
identify the governing legal principles in the first place.428 The 
Second Circuit applied its formulation of manifest disregard, and 
it correctly concluded that there was no evidence that the 
arbitrators intentionally ignored governing law.429  
The framework proposed by this Note attempts to harmonize 
the Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen decisions, and also to provide a 
new way of looking at substantive judicial review of arbitral 
awards. It allows vacatur when a party can show that the 
arbitrator did not apply a legal principle from the governing law 
designated by the parties, or that the arbitrator intentionally 
refused to apply clearly governing law.430 It includes procedural 
safeguards to prevent abuse and preserve arbitration’s speed and 
finality.431 The most important purpose of this Note, though, is to 
                                                                                                     
federal circuits that currently allow courts to infer an arbitrator’s knowledge or 
intent). 
 421. Supra Part IV.A. 
 422. See Besser, Manifest Mistake Is Dead!, supra note 151, at 68 (“If the 
parties really want to preserve a right to appeal an arbitration award on 
traditional grounds, they might just as well litigate.”). 
 423. See supra notes 217–24 and accompanying text (explaining why Stolt-
Nielsen sanctions limited substantive review of arbitral awards). 
 424. Supra Part IV.A. 
 425. Supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 426. Supra Part IV.C. 
 427. Supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 428. Supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
 429. Supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 430. Supra Part IV.C–E. 
 431. Supra Parts IV.A, IV.F. 
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suggest a dialogue about how judicial review of arbitral awards 
should look in the wake of Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen. This 
Note is not the complete solution, but rather a call for a coherent, 
predictable federal framework for analyzing substantive 
challenges to arbitrator decisions. 
  
